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Abstract 
 
Sidewalk vendors are becoming a more common presence in cities in Latin America and 
the United States.  Vendor demand for the best sidewalk vending spots increasingly 
exceeds supply, making necessary a system to allocate space in what is essentially an 
open access commons.  This paper presents an empirical study of two very different 
systems of allocation that have been adopted in the city of Los Angeles, California, a 
formal one imposed by the city on legal vendors when they were unable to come up with 
one on their own, and a second that was embraced by illegal vendors across the street on 
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2an informal basis.  The fact that illegal vendors were able to adopt any system at all, 
while a handful of legal vendors were unable to when given the same opportunity, is not 
what would have been predicted by social norms scholarship.  Nor can it be attributed to 
the activities of local street gangs.  Instead the respective success and failure of these two 
groups of vendors are best explained by Robert Sugden’s game theory of spontaneous 
order.  Turning to their relative merit, the illegal vendors’ system of space allocation is 
superior, enjoying as it does a number of efficiencies.  By contrast, the city’s formal 
system suffers from a number of costs.  It seems intent less on benefiting the community 
as a whole than on protecting traditional storefront merchants from legitimate 
competition. 
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4I. Introduction 
 
Why are many legal vending spots in Los Angeles empty while illegal vendors 
stand elbow to elbow across the street?  When the city legalized vending in MacArthur 
Park, the aim was to lure there vendors who were already plying their trade illegally in 
the surrounding neighborhood.  Legal vending there is now defunct.  But even in its 
heyday the MacArthur Park legal vending district had the feel of a moribund petting zoo.  
Beautiful city-approved carts were stocked with state-sanctioned products and manned at 
officially designated locations.  Each licensed vendor was one of more than thirty 
graduates of a special government-mandated vending training program, but only a half-
dozen of them bothered to show up on the sidewalk on a typical day.  Meanwhile, across 
the street, where vending is against the law, there was a buzz of activity, which continues 
today.  The city enforces the law against illegal vending only sporadically.  Soon after 
law enforcement leaves the scene, illegal vendors re-emerge like flowers after the spring 
thaw.  Dozens of illegal vendors hawk their wares on busy sidewalks that have become a 
bazaar where anything that can be sold from a cardboard box, a blanket, or a suitcase is 
there for the asking.  Why didn’t more vendors go legal?  Why did the legal district fail?  
Despite efforts to stamp it out, why does illegal vending continue to flourish? 
The answer lies in part in property rights.  The success of any vendor depends on 
finding a good spot from which to vend, and choice spots are highly coveted and scarce.  
The legal vendors in MacArthur Park and the illegal vendors across the street both sell 
from land that is traditionally open to the public at large—a commons.  But how that land 
is allocated is dramatically different.  In MacArthur Park, a system of allocating space 
among the legal sidewalk vendors who operate there was formally adopted by the city.  
5Across the street, a completely different system for allocating scarce sidewalk space was 
adopted by illegal vendors on an informal basis.  It is the formality of one property 
system and the informality of the other that substantially explains the different outcomes 
in these two parts of a commons. 
 The significance of property rights in the management of commons resources has 
been the subject of a lively debate.  Substantial work has been done in examining the 
ability of private individuals to allocate them informally, without the involvement of the 
state.  Commentators such as Elinor Ostrom and James Acheson have identified a number 
of examples where private individuals have organized to allocate commons resources and 
avoid overuse, or a “tragedy of the commons,” in the language of Garrett Hardin’s oft-
cited piece.2 Ostrom and others have also reported on efforts at informal allocation of 
commons resources that have proven to be failures, and tried to identify the conditions 
for the emergence of informal systems that will succeed.3 Their work has been 
overlapped by scholarship on informal order generally, especially in the areas of game 
theory and social norms.4
2 JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (explaining how Maine lobster men have 
organized themselves into gangs that “own” fishing territory communally and exclude non-gang members 
through self-help); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 18-21, 61-65, 82-85 (1990) (describing how individuals have repeatedly found a way 
to cooperate and manage common pool resources as diverse as fisheries in Turkey, mountain meadows in 
Switzerland, and irrigated water in the Philippines).  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968), reprinted in part in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW at 132 (arguing that designating a resource as an open access commons will lead to over-
use, that is, “a tragedy of the commons”). 
3 Gary D. Libecap, The Conditions For Successful Collective Action, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE 170-80 (1995) (examining difficulties in organizing to control exploitation of oil field 
and fishery); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 144-178, 211 (1990) (describing how individuals have been unable to cooperate to 
manage common pool resources such as fisheries in Turkey and groundwater in California, and listing 
factors that characterize successful informal regimes for common pool management). 
4 E.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-12, (1984) (cooperation will emerge in a 
prisoners’ dilemma game in which players believe they are likely to encounter each other again); ROBERT 
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (examining informal 
resolution of trespass disputes through social norms); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 49-67 
(2000) (examining informal order through social norms in a variety of contexts); Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
6Similar work has also been done on the formal side.  A number of commentators 
have examined the rules allocating commons resources that have been formally adopted 
by government.  Shawn Kantor and Thomas Merrill, among others, have studied 
instances where government has adopted formal rules for the allocation of common 
resources, not only to explain their adoption in descriptive terms, but also to assess their 
merit.5 Still other commentators have attempted to shed light on the transitions between 
informal systems and formal ones.6 For all this work, though, we are still left with an 
important question that has gone largely unanswered.  For any single commons resource, 
is it better to manage it informally or formally?  All but absent from the literature is a 
study that could well inform such a choice:  a side by side, live action comparison of an 
informal system on the on hand and a formal system on the other.  
This paper constitutes an attempt to fill this gap in the literature.  The practice of 
sidewalk vending in the MacArthur Park neighborhood presents a unique opportunity in 
 
Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that in many urban communities, 
government efforts to promote order through land use regulation hinder efforts to eliminate social disorder 
through informal means); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting On The Subject:  A Critique Of The Social 
Influence Conception Of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, And Order-Maintenance Policing New 
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (critically examining the empirical evidence and social influence 
explanation supporting New York City’s experiment with order-maintenance policing); Andrea McDowell, 
Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (2004) 
(emergence of informal rules among miners during the California Gold Rush best explained by game 
theory). 
5 E.g.,Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 291-293 (2000) (paucity of 
market-based incentives in environmental law best explained by hybrid theory of wealth maximization and 
distribution); SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, POLITICS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE CLOSING OF THE OPEN 
RANGE IN THE POST-BELLUM SOUTH (Chicago 1998) (distributional conflicts prevented the adoption of a 
liability regime for animal trespass that would have maximized societal wealth); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Allocation Of The Commons:  Parking On Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515 (2002) (government 
system of changing property rights in parking spaces is undermined by a political process that tends to be 
more responsive to the interests of particular interest groups). 
6 E.g., Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  A Study of the American 
West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163 (1975) (evolution of rules of asset ownership in the American West were 
determined by changes in cost-benefit variables); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV. PAPER & PROC. 347 (1967) (property rights regimes evolve in response to changes in 
demand and technology, generally in the direction of more privatization); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion 
Versus Governance:  Two Strategies For Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) 
(explaining replacement of private property with the open field system in England during the Middle 
Ages). 
7the study of property rights regimes.  A single resource—the sidewalk—in a single 
place—a neighborhood in Los Angeles, California—has been divided in two parts, each 
of which is subject to two dramatically different property rights regimes within a stone’s 
throw of one another.  Further, the resource in the two areas is being put to the same 
use—vending—at the same time and by users nearly all of whom share the same cultural 
background—Spanish-speaking Central-American immigrants.  By holding these 
variables constant as it were, the comparison of these two property rights regimes is not 
only unique, but also robust.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to explain the emergence and assess the 
merit of each of these two systems of allocating sidewalk vending space in a commons, 
the method formally adopted by the city of Los Angeles, and the one arrived at 
informally by illegal vendors next door.  Allocating sidewalk space has become an 
increasingly important issue.  In the United States this is due partly to communities’ 
embrace of “new urbanism” and the lively street life it espouses.7 But even aside from 
these changed attitudes among city planners, pressures on sidewalk space have been 
increasing due to the pressures of private actors.  Judging from the amount of media and 
legal attention devoted to it, sidewalk vending activity has increased in recent years.  This 
occurrence has been most widely reported in Latin American countries, such as Mexico,8
and cities in the United States with large Latin American immigrant populations, such as 
 
7 Haya El Nasser, 'New Urbanism' Embraces Latinos, USA TODAY, February 16, 2005, at 3A (arguing 
that “new urbanism” agenda is consistent with immigrant Latino tastes for compact neighborhoods, lively 
street life, and sidewalk vendors). 
8 Marla Dickerson, Mexico Runs on Sidewalk Economy, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, May 9, 2005, Main, 
Part A, at 1 (informal economy, of which sidewalk vending is a part, was Mexico’s sole source of 
employment growth during 2000-2004); Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons,
77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2004) (discussing increased vending activity in developing countries). 
8New York City and Los Angeles, California.9 But sidewalk vendors are also popping up 
in many less exotic places.  No less than fifteen cities in the United States have legalized 
vending to some extent, charging vendors a license fee.10 From Boise, Idaho11 to 
Jacksonville, Florida,12 and from Phoenix, Arizona13 to Port Huron, Michigan,14 
communities all across the country are now struggling with how to deal with sidewalk 
vending.  If vending should be legal at all, how should sidewalk space be allocated 
among vendors and other users?  In other words, what property regime should be adopted 
for a common pool resource such as the sidewalk? 
This study is about more than just sidewalk vending, though.  A secondary object 
of this paper is inform policy making in the management of a variety of other commons 
resources that are increasingly strained.  These include resources as diverse as fisheries, 
public lands, and the air we breathe.  Understanding how and how well social order has 
been achieved on the public sidewalk—through two very different approaches—may 
shed light on how competing claims to these other scarce common pool resources may be 
 
9 Rich Shapiro, Crackdown Is Crisis For Street Vendors, DAILY NEWS (New York), August 28, 2005, at 19 
(discussing reaction to New York City’s increase in fine structure for illegal vending); Gregg W. Kettles, 
Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2004) (discussing increased 
vending activity in the United States). 
10 Ginger D. Richardson, Phoenix Considers Selling Sidewalk Space To Highest Bidders; Vendors’ Turf 
Wars Concern City Officials, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, March 3, 2004, Local, at 1B (Atlanta; Boston; 
Denver; Detroit; Kansas City, Missouri; Madison, Wisconsin; Milwaukee; Minneapolis; New York; 
Phoenix; St. Louis; San Diego; San Francisco; and Seattle); Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the 
Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2004) (Los Angeles). 
11 Brad Hem, Boise Vendors Want Spot Back At 6th & Main, THE IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), August 13, 
2005, Local, at 1 (city installed metal markers on sidewalk in an effort to disperse vendors and ease 
congestion). 
12 Christopher F. Aguilar, Bill On Street-Side Seafood Sales Generates Opposition, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION 
(Jacksonville), April 27, 2005, Shorelines, at L-10 (city bill to bar some sidewalk vending). 
13 Ginger D. Richardson and Monica Alonzo-Dunsmoor, Fine-Tuning The Art Walk; Leaders Hope To 
Control Issues Without Killing The Fun, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, August 5, 2005, at 1A (city considering 
regulating informal monthly downtown street festival that includes sidewalk vendors); Ginger D. 
Richardson, Phoenix Considers Selling Sidewalk Space To Highest Bidders; Vendors’ Turf Wars Concern 
City Officials, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, March 3, 2004, Local, at 1B (city considering increasing regulation 
of vending near sports arena). 
14 Our View, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Michigan), Opinion, at 7A (city planners and private landowners 
discussing opening part of street to sidewalk vendors). 
9better resolved.  By controlling for a host of independent variables, this paper provides a 
rare opportunity to explain the emergence and assess the relative merit of two systems for 
allocating rights to use commons resources, one formal and the other informal. 
A word about the paper’s organization is in order.  Part II presents an empirical 
study of the two systems for allocating sidewalk space.15 The informal system adopted 
by the illegal vendors is based on the principal of first possession.  It has two aspects.  
One aspect refers to the right of every vendor to use a space that they occupy first on any 
given day.  That right expires when the vendor leaves the space, and no later than the end 
of the day.  The second aspect refers to the right enjoyed by a vendor to use a space that 
she has repeatedly occupied day after day for some period of time.  Her right to that spot 
is durable.  She is “established.”  If an established vendor arrives at her spot to find it 
occupied by an interloper, the interloper must move.  The right to sell from a spot held by 
an established vendor is superior to that held by another vendor that occupied that same 
spot first on a particular day.  In other words, a use right of short duration, that is, for the 
day, may evolve into a right of use that is durable.  A different system was developed 
across the street in the legal vending district.  After the legal vendors were unable to 
come up with a way to allocate sidewalk space on their own, the city imposed one for 
them.  At first the city allocated spots by lottery.  Later it reassigned them and positioned 
newcomers with putative goals of helping the vendors and beautifying the neighborhood. 
Part III explains how the illegal vendors succeeded in developing an informal 
system for allocating sidewalk space while legal vendors failed when given the same 
chance.  It situates this challenge of informally ordering sidewalk use within a broader 
 
15 In an earlier paper, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2004), I argued 
that sidewalk vending should be much less restricted than it is today.  That argument was based in part on a 
street level investigation of vending that I conducted.  That same empirical research provides part of the 
foundation for this paper as well.  My research methods are described in the appendix to that earlier paper. 
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inquiry of property scholarship that considers how order may be achieved informally 
without intervention by the state.16 Property theories of social norms fail to explain either 
the emergence of informal order among illegal vendors or its absence among legal ones.  
Nor may sidewalk order be attributed to street gangs as a kind of private government.  
Instead, both the presence of an informal allocative system among illegal vendors and the 
absence of one among legal ones is best explained by Robert Sugden’s theory of 
spontaneous order.17 
Part IV assesses the relative merit of the two allocative systems:  the one adopted 
informally by illegal vendors, and the formal system adopted by the city and imposed on 
the legal vendors operating in the MacArthur Park vending district.  For yardsticks I draw 
on certain theories of property rights evolution, including wealth maximization,18 
16 E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) 
(examining informal resolution of trespass disputes through social norms); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING 
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (describing how 
individuals have repeatedly found a way to cooperate and manage common pool resources as diverse as 
fisheries in Turkey, mountain meadows in Switzerland, and groundwater in Southern California); Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, 
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (examining informal order in the cotton industry); ERIC A. 
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 49-67 (2000) (examining informal order through social norms in a 
variety of contexts); Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231 (2001) (arguing that social 
norms are unlikely to be able to resolve “large number, small-payoff” problems of collective action); 
Robert McAdams, Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (norms will be stronger in smaller groups, 
especially when close-knit).  See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3-12, (1984) 
(cooperation will emerge in a prisoners’ dilemma game in which players believe they are likely to 
encounter each other again).  Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that in many urban communities, government efforts to promote order through land 
use regulation hinder efforts to eliminate social disorder through informal means); Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Reflecting On The Subject:  A Critique Of The Social Influence Conception Of Deterrence, The Broken 
Windows Theory, And Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) 
(critically examining the empirical evidence and social influence explanation supporting New York City’s 
experiment with order-maintenance policing). 
17 Sugden’s theory has enjoyed renewed attention recently.  Andrea McDowell has argued that the theory of 
spontaneous order provides a more satisfying explanation than norms for the emergence of a property 
system in mines during the California gold rush.  Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, 
and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (2004).  Cf. Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of 
Spontaneous Formation:  The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7 (2004) 
(arguing that private legal systems typically do not form spontaneously, but evolve from existing networks 
that originally facilitated low-enforcement-cost norms). 
18 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPER & PROC. 347 (1967).  
Demsetz’ theory of wealth maximization continues to command the attention of property scholars today.  
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 41-48 (5th ed. Aspen Law and Business 2002) 
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distribution,19 and ideology.20 The illegal vendors’ informal allocative system enjoys a 
number of efficiencies, and is best explained by the theory of wealth maximization.  By 
contrast, the formal system adopted by the city suffered from a number of costs.  It was 
really aimed not so much at maximizing the value of the sidewalk for vending as it was in 
protecting powerful interest groups, especially traditional storefront merchants.  The 
city’s formal system is best explained by a theory distribution.  It was inferior to the 
informal system of sidewalk space allocation enjoyed by the illegal vendors.  Section V 
concludes by drawing implications of this study for other resources and suggesting 
avenues for further study. 
 
(article excerpt in casebook); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 49-53 (Foundation Press 1998) (same); Terry L. Anderson and 
Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  A Study of the American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163 
(1975) (rules of asset ownership in the American West were determined by cost-benefit variables); Richard 
O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the California 
Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001) (the property rights regime in mines that emerged during the 
California Gold Rush “supports earlier rational choice interpretations that property arrangements settling 
the American Western frontier were based on the marginal costs and benefits of defining and enforcing 
property rights”); Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S489 
(2002) (smaller, more homogeneous groups are more likely to adopt wealth maximizing property rules than 
centralized political processes). 
19 Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 291-293 (2000) (paucity of 
market-based incentives in environmental law best explained by hybrid theory of wealth maximization and 
distribution); SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, POLITICS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE CLOSING OF THE OPEN 
RANGE IN THE POST-BELLUM SOUTH (Chicago 1998) (distributional conflicts prevented the adoption of a 
liability regime for animal trespass that would have maximized societal wealth); Stuart Banner, Transitions 
Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002) (pointing out the significant distributional 
benefits that flowed to those who reorganized the property rights regime in Europe and its colonies between 
1500 and 1900); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation Of The Commons:  Parking On Public Roads, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S515 (2002) (government system of changing property rights in parking spaces is 
undermined by a political process that tends to be more responsive to the interests of particular interest 
groups); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 
(2002) (movements between private property and common property equally well explained by theories of 
wealth maximization and distribution). 
20 Andrea G. McDowell, From Commons to Claims:  Property Rights in the California Gold Rush, 14 
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 (2002) (miners in Gold Rush California developed restrictions on claim holder 
rights that did not maximize the production of wealth for society as a whole, but rather reflected new norms 
of egalitarianism and anti-capitalism). 
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II. The Two Systems For Allocation Of Sidewalk Vending Space 
 
In large cities in the United States and around the world, it is not uncommon to 
see people selling things from the sidewalk.  In this country, the practice of sidewalk 
vending is common in Los Angeles, California, particularly in the neighborhood 
surrounding the city’s MacArthur Park.  There a typical vendor will place a blanket or 
piece of cardboard on the sidewalk, and display their wares on top.  Alternatively, she 
might sell her goods out of a box or suitcase.  Sidewalk vendors offer just about 
everything.  They sell shampoo, batteries, bracelets, watches, sliced fruit, cigarettes, 
books, videotapes, and clothing, to name a few.  Some vending spots are more lucrative 
than others.  Choice spots are scarce and highly coveted.  How are they allocated? 
For about five years the MacArthur Park neighborhood had not one, but rather 
two systems for allocating vending space.  Vending is legal only in the park itself, on 
sidewalks that lie on the west side of Alvarado Street and the north side of Seventh 
Street.  (See map next page.)   There one system for allocating vending space was 
formally adopted by the city.  A second system for allocating vending space exists 
outside the park’s legal vending district.  Across the street, the sidewalks on the east side 
of Alvarado Street in between Sixth Street and Seventh Street, which I will refer to as 
“the Strip,” have hosted perhaps the greatest concentration of vendors in the 
neighborhood.  (See map next page.)   The vending space allocation system there was 
adopted by the illegal vendors on an informal basis.  The two systems are dramatically 
different. 
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A. Illegal Vendors Informally Allocate Space Under A Two-Tiered System Of 
First Possession 
 
There can be no doubt that an allocative system is necessary, at least on the Strip, 
because of the heavy demand for vending space.  During weekday afternoons, I saw as 
many as twenty vendors selling there.  The corners were consistently occupied, with  
other vendors setting up in between.  On the weekends, I saw their numbers along those 
two blocks of Alvarado swell to forty or fifty.  They occupied not only the corners where 
two streets intersected, but the sidewalk in between as well.  None of the vendors was 
blocking all pedestrian traffic.  Two pedestrians could still walk abreast up the sidewalk.   
But the area in between this open path and the curb was filled with vendors, packed 
elbow to elbow. 
 The Strip, which runs along Alvarado Street for two blocks, is intersected by three 
streets:  Sixth Street, Seventh Street, and Wilshire Boulevard.  All of these streets carry 
heavy automobile and pedestrian traffic.  In addition, a subway station entrance is 
situated on the Strip between Seventh and Wilshire.  By selling at the corners where these 
two streets intersect Alvarado, a vendor may significantly increase her visibility to 
potential customers.  It stands to reason that, compared to other places on the block, the 
corners are more profitable.  This is likely part of the reason why, even on weekday 
afternoons when pedestrian traffic was relatively light, these corners were consistently 
occupied.   
Given the intensity of use of the sidewalk by these vendors, one might expect that 
allocation of scarce sidewalk vending space would involve the state.  This could take 
place either directly, such as through state-run auctions or rationing, or indirectly, such as 
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through the enforcement of property rights traded in a market.  It turns out that the state is 
not at all involved in vending space allocation on the Strip.  The city of Los Angeles has 
made sidewalk vending a crime.  Outside of a small area in MacArthur Park on the other 
side of Alvarado Street where vending is legal, sidewalk vending is a misdemeanor.  
Having criminalized the conduct, it is not surprising then that the city has taken no steps 
to allocate prime spaces among illegal vendors. 
A system for allocating spaces was adopted by the illegal vendors informally.  
Their system is based on the principle of first possession.  It has two aspects.  In its first 
aspect, a vendor may set up and sell from any place on the sidewalk that is vacant when 
they arrive.  If a second vendor shows up later hoping to sell from the space occupied by 
the first, the second has no right to compel the first to leave.  The first to occupy the 
space that day has the right to sell from it.  This right of use lasts only for the day.  
Vendors do not camp in their spots overnight.  They leave in the evening, and take their 
unsold goods and other belongings with them.  The next day vendors start with a clean 
slate.  As one vendor put it, if he gets there late and the area where he usually sits is 
occupied, he goes somewhere else.21 
The vendors’ system of space allocation has a second aspect as well.  It allows 
long-term vendors to get durable rights to vending places.  When a vendor has been 
selling from a place on the sidewalk on a regular basis for several months, they become 
“established.”  They no longer need to arrive at that spot at any particular hour on a given 
day.  If the established vendor arrives late and finds her spot occupied by another vendor, 
the other vendor will surrender the spot to the established vendor and move on.  One 
established vendor explained that she does not have problems with other vendors.  They 
 
21 Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002). 
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do not “mess around” with her because they “respect her.”  This has been her spot for 
“many years.”22 Another established vendor confirmed that new vendors have 
“problems” with their spots and have to move from one place to another.23 
How much time does a vendor have to spend on the sidewalk to become 
“established” and get a durable right to use a space on the sidewalk?  There appears to be 
no bright line rule.  Of the twenty-one vendors we interviewed on the Strip, seven 
indicated that they had been a party to a dispute over vending space.  Three of them 
reported that they successfully held their ground and continued to vend from the disputed 
space.  All three of these could be characterized as “full time” vendors.  That is, they 
came to vend most days of the week.  One claimed to have been vending in that place 
“for years,” a second for five to six years, and the third for fifteen years.24 Four vendors 
admitted to backing down from a dispute over space.  None of them had been vending on 
the Strip for more than six months.25 One who had been vending for six months may 
have been on the verge of becoming established.  He claimed that vendors are always 
 
22 Interview with mamomes vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh 
Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
23 Interview with necklace vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
24 Interview with mamomes vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh 
Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with pastry vendor on the sidewalk at the 
north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); 
Interview with necklace vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
25 Interview with silver ring vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (vending there for 3 months); Interview with tennis 
shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002) (vending there for one week); Interview with belt and watch 
vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002) (vending there for 6 months); Interview with vendor of shampoo, 
batteries, lighters, and cigarettes on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (vending there for 3 months). 
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fighting amongst each other for spots, “but he is respected.”  But when friction between 
him and another vendor does arise, he backs down and moves to another location.26 
From time to time the city takes active steps to clear the area of illegal vendors.  
When I returned to the Strip some years after I collected the main body of data for this 
study, I saw that vending activity was at low ebb.27 MacArthur Park had long suffered 
from a reputation for drug dealing, disorder, and danger.28 In a well-intentioned effort to 
make the park attractive to the law-abiding, the city mistook informal order for disorder 
and swept the area of illegal vendors shortly before my arrival.29 Some had already 
returned to the Strip, thereby demonstrating the resiliency of vending and the continued 
strong demand for prime vending space.30 
B. Following A Failed Attempt At Informal Allocation, Spaces In The Legal 
Vending District Were Formally Allocated By The State According To A 
Series Of Competing Principles 
 
This informal system of space allocation among illegal vendors on the Strip 
stands in sharp contrast to the formal system adopted in the legal vending district across 
the street.31 Before opening the district in 1999, the city of Los Angeles contracted its 
 
26 Interview with belt and watch vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire 
Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002). 
27 Visual inspection of the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Sixth Street and Seventh Street in Los 
Angeles, California (March 13, 2006) (three illegal vendors). 
28 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (March 14, 2006). 
29 Id.
30 Visual inspection of the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Sixth Street and Seventh Street in Los 
Angeles, California (March 13, 2006) (three illegal vendors). 
31 The district is situated in Los Angeles’ MacArthur Park.  Vendors are limited to certain sidewalks 
bordering the park, on the north side of Seventh Street between Alvarado Street and Park View Street, and 
on the west side of Alvarado Street between Wilshire Boulevard and Seventh Street.  Rhonda Roumani, 
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management to a third party, who in turn hired a non-profit organization, the Institute for 
Urban Research and Development (“IURD”).32 Between 12 and 20 vendors were 
selected to open the district.33 The IURD had a series of meetings with these vendors to 
determine the allocation of vending spaces.34 The vendors tried to come up with a plan 
on their own.  Some vending spots close to a bus stop were considered more desirable.35 
In a series of meetings, the vendors agreed on an allocation of about 70 to 80 percent of 
the spots.36 But after as many as ten meetings, no agreement could be reached among 
the vendors as to how to allocate the remainder.   
Management at the IURD felt compelled to intervene.  It worried that if the IURD 
did not take matters into its own hands, the vendors would have gravitated to spots that 
looked “good” and resolved competing claims to a spot by giving it to the vendor 
happened to get there first.37 This is, of course, the method of allocation followed by the 
illegal vendors across the street. 
The IURD imposed its own allocative system, electing first to assign vending 
spots by lottery.38 It does not appear that the vendors traded any of the resulting 
 
Hernandez Announces Launching of City’s First Sidewalk Vending District, METROPOLITAN NEWS-
ENTERPRISE/CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE, June 4, 1999, at 11. 
32 Rhonda Roumani, Hernandez Announces Launching of City’s First Sidewalk Vending District,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 4, 1999, at 11; Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, 
Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 
2002). 
33 Rhonda Roumani, Hernandez Announces Launching of City’s First Sidewalk Vending District,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 4, 1999, at 11; Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, 
Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 
2002). 
34 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002). 
35 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002). 
36 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, The Institute for Urban Research and Development, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002). 
37 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002). 
38 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, The Institute for Urban Research and Development, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002). 
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assignments.  Later, as additional vendors were added to the district, the IURD directed 
their placement and reallocated previously assigned spaces.  In these assignments, the 
IURD sought not only to help the legal vendors but also to beautify the neighborhood.  
These two goals were not necessarily mutually reinforcing.  Compare the experience of 
tamale vendors with others.  Tamales are sold by a number of vendors, each with a slight 
variation in style, according to the country of origin.  The IURD directed the tamale 
vendors to set up in a row across the street from a Mama’s Restaurant, which is operated 
by the IURD and sells the same things.  By contrast, other merchandise vendors selling 
similar products were deliberately dispersed by the IURD.39 Some legal vendors refused 
to sell every day, leaving gaps on the sidewalk.  The IURD considered this unsightly, and 
directed the vendors to leave their assigned spots and “close ranks” on those days.  
Certain vendors objected.  The IURD believed the vendors were “superstitious” about 
staying in their spots, but gave in anyway.  The IURD’s policy of requiring vendors to 
close ranks when one of their neighbors is absent was not enforced.40 
It was nearly as if the IURD threw a party and nobody came.  The IURD had 
assigned spots for 33 vending carts.41 But on typical weekday afternoons when the 
district was still operating, I saw no more than ten legal vendors.42 On a weekend, the 
most I saw was thirteen.43 Most of the assigned legal spots sat vacant.  Pedestrian traffic 
was light.  Business was slow.  This scene contrasts sharply with the bustling activity I 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, Institute for Urban Research and Development, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002).  Cf. Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program 
Director, Institute for Urban Research and Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002) (the 
program has 31 or 32 carts). 
42 Visual inspection of MacArthur Park at Alvarado Street and Seventh Street (Wednesday, July 10, 2002) 
(five legal carts); Visual inspection of MacArthur Park at Alvarado Street and Seventh Street (Wednesday, 
July 24, 2002) (ten legal carts). 
43 Visual inspection of MacArthur Park at Alvarado Street and Seventh Street (Sunday, July 21, 2002). 
20
saw across the street.  There, on the Strip, illegal vendors stood elbow to elbow.  All of 
the available vending spaces running a block and a half north from Seventh Street were 
taken.  Pedestrian traffic was substantial.  Business appeared to be brisk. 
Why were the illegal vendors able to arrive at a method of allocating prime 
vending spaces on the sidewalk without the assistance of the state?  Why were the legal 
vendors unable to do the same?  Is there a single theory that can explain both facts? 
 
III. The Success Of Illegal Vendors In Adopting An Informal System Of 
Allocating Renting Space, And The Failure Of Legal Vendors To Do The Same, Are 
Better Explained By Sugden’s Game Theory Of Spontaneous Order, Than By Theories 
Of Social Norms Or Street Gang Governance 
 
A number of scholars have attempted to explain how individuals coordinate their 
activities outside of the law.  One group has focused on the role of social norms.  A 
second has focused on the game theory of spontaneous order.  Still other commentators 
on sidewalk life claim that street gangs coordinate the actions of private individuals by 
acting as a kind of private government.  Both the social norms and gang government 
approaches are attractive.  I think they do not, however, adequately explain either the 
success of the illegal vendors in informally allocating sidewalk space or the failure of 
legal vendors to do the same.  The game theory of spontaneous order offers an 
explanation that is much more complete. 
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A. Social Norms 
 
Social norms are extra-legal rules governing individual behavior.  Norms are 
enforced not by the state, but rather by private individuals through the imposition of 
social sanctions and withholding of social benefits.44 
Social norm commentators disagree amongst themselves as to the relative 
importance of certain types of sanctions and benefits in motivating individuals to behave 
in conformity with a norm.45 Some have emphasized the importance of socialization 
through immediate sanctions and benefits, which are delivered through internal or 
external means.46 Internal enforcement occurs when an individual feels shame or pride 
depending on how close they have come to conforming to the norm.47 External 
enforcement is administered by others who have the power to withhold esteem from 
nonconforming individuals.48 
Regardless whether enforcement is internal or external, it is immediate.  
According to this view of social norms then, individuals respond to short term incentives.  
Other norms theorists have explained norm conformity by emphasizing the importance of 
social benefits an individual hopes to enjoy in the more distant future.  This “social 
capital” view of social norms contends that individuals respond to long-term incentives.49 
44 Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L & ECON. REV. 1, 3 (2001). 
45 Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 771, 803-807 (2004) (summarizing the literature). 
46 Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 771, 803 (2004). 
47 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537, 539 (1998); 
Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 771, 805 (2004). 
48 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537, 539 (1998); 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous 
Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 805 (2004). 
49 Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 771, 803 (2004). 
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1. Norms Enforced By Short Term Incentives 
 
The short term incentives theory of norms argues that individuals conform out of 
a desire to enjoy immediate gains and avoid immediate losses that result from 
enforcement that is either internal or external.  One prominent proponent of the internal 
enforcement theory of norms is Robert Cooter.  He argues that “internalized” norms are 
norms that people follow through self-enforcement, which takes shape in feelings of 
pride and guilt.  The extent to which a person has internalized a norm is measured by the 
amount he is willing to pay to conform to it.  This internal demand for norm compliance 
is determined not only by an individual’s taste for the norm.  Demand by one individual 
may also increase as the number of other people who also conform to the norm increases 
or if the law reinforces compliance with it.50 
The theory of internalized norms has little explanatory power for behavior among 
vendors on the sidewalk.  It does not explain either the success of the illegal vendors in 
cooperating to allocate space on the sidewalk or the failure of the legal vendors across the 
street to do the same.  As to illegal vendors, there is little evidence that feelings of shame 
or pride were what motivated some individual vendors to stand their ground, and others 
to back down.  Those who backed down never expressed to us any feelings of shame at 
having tested the rule, or pride at having backed down.  The closest any of the “losers” 
ever came characterizing space conflicts in moral terms was when one called a winner 
“crazy.”   
 
50 Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 
Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000); Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold 
Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 805 (2004). (summarizing the theory) 
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Similar attitudes are held by the winners of vending space disputes.  None talked 
about any “pride” she felt in holding on to their spot.  That may of course be exactly how 
they felt.  But this is hard to prove convincingly, and illustrates a problem with the theory 
of internalized norms.  Because the theory rests not so much on what people do but rather 
on how they feel, it is difficult to verify it.51 Even if the theory of internal enforcement 
was able to explain how illegal vendors were able to coalesce around a rule for allocating 
sidewalk space, how could it also explain the failure of the legal vendors across the street 
to do the same?  For these reasons the theory of internalized norms seems unable to 
explain the presence or absence of order regarding allocation of vending space on the 
sidewalk. 
The theory of norms that focuses on short-term enforcement by external agents 
likewise seems to come up short when applied to the sidewalk.  According to this theory, 
the community enforces social norms through informal sanctions, such as self-help, 
especially negative truthful gossip and force, and ostracism.   In Order Without Law,
Robert Ellickson illustrated the external enforcement of norms with an empirical study of 
how ranchers in Shasta County, California resolve trespass disputes.52 There a norm of 
reciprocal restraint exists that calls upon ranchers to swallow minor costs of trespass 
incidents and keep a mental accounting of them.  If accounts become seriously out of 
balance, though, the “creditor” is allowed to engage in self-help retaliation against the 
offender.  Most commonly this takes the form of truthful negative gossip.  But if that 
does not work, the creditor may resort to tougher self-help sanctions, such as the use of 
force.  Negative gossip works against everyone in the community except extreme 
 
51 Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L & ECON. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (2001) (arguing that 
“patterns of external sanctions are the best evidence of the existence of a norm”). 
52 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
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deviants.  This is because rural residents, being small in number and relatively rooted, 
deal with each other on a number of fronts and expect to do so long into the future.  They 
value their reputation.  Deviants tend to be those who expect to leave the community 
soon. 
This external enforcement theory of norms would likely not predict what 
happened on the sidewalk in Los Angeles.  With respect to the illegal vendors, the 
external enforcement theory would be pessimistic about the ability of the illegal vendors 
to allocate space on the sidewalk by virtue of social norms.  The theory rests on the 
existence of a community like Shasta County, which is close-knit and continuing.  This is 
not so clearly the case among vendors on the Strip.  Granted, there are some indications 
that established vendors know and lookout for each other.  One outside observer 
characterized them as a “union.”  But the vendors include a number who are new and 
expect not to stay long.  The costs of entering the sidewalk as a vendor are relatively low, 
as are the costs of moving a new sidewalk vending business to another part of town.  The 
neighborhood around the Strip is also especially transient, being the region’s doorstep for 
new immigrants from Latin America.53 Because of this, a vendor who refused to abide 
by a norm for space allocation would have less to fear from negative gossip or ostracism.  
 
53 Beverly Beyette, Vendors vs. the Law - Unlicensed Street Merchants: Able Entrepreneurs or Nuisances?, 
L.A. Times, Home Edition, June 27, 1990, at E1 (characterizing this part of the city as "the heart of the 
Central American immigrant community").  The zip code in which the park is situated is home to around 
57,000 people, of which nearly 70% are Latino or Hispanic.  2000 U.S. Census (showing that zip code 
90057, the area around MacArthur Park, has population of 56,997, of which 39,311 are Hispanic or 
Latino), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-context=qt&-zip=90057&-
r_name=DEC_2000_PL_U_QTPL&street=alvarado%20st.%20at%20sixth%20st.&-
ds_name=DEC_2000_PL_U&-city=Los%20Angeles&-CHECK_SEARCH_RESULTS=N&-
tree_id=400&-all_geo_types=N&geo_id=14000US06037208400&-geo_id=14000US06037208500&-
geo_id=14000US06037208610&-geo_id=14000US06037208620&-
geo_id=14000US06037208710&geo_id=14000US06037208720&-
geo_id=14000US06037208800&geo_id=000US06037208902&-geo_id=14000US06037208903&-
geo_id=14000US06037208904&geo_id=14000US06037209401&geo_id=14000US06037209402&-
geo_id=14000US06037209403&-search_results000US06&-format=&-fully_or_partially=N&-_lang=en&-
states=California (last visited April 8, 2004). 
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They could just move their business to another part of the city for a fresh start.  So the 
external enforcement theory of social norms does not appear to explain the existence of 
order on the Strip. 
The external enforcement theory does not fare any better with respect to space 
allocation in the legal vending district.  Where the theory would predict success, there 
was failure.  That district was opened with no more than 20 vendors.  Each of these 
vendors had completed a rigorous six week training program.  So they had invested a lot 
in the prospect of vending in the district.  Moreover, their investment could not easily be 
applied elsewhere.  While the law contemplated the opening of other legal vending 
districts, after several disappointments this was at the time the only one that had been 
created.  When the district was organized and before a method of allocating spaces on the 
sidewalk was devised, each vendor had reason to believe that they would be sharing the 
district with these nineteen other vendors for some time.  They would all store their carts 
in the same place, and would be vending within a block of one another.  In other words, 
the legal vending district was set up as a limited access commons that was open to only 
20 individuals that had no where else to go in the city to pursue their trade legally.   
Notwithstanding these seemingly fertile conditions for the creation of norms 
governing space allocation on the sidewalk, none arose among the legal vendors.  Most 
cooperated, but a few held out.  This prevented the vendors from reaching an agreement.  
The IURD stepped in with its own system.54 So in a circumstance where one might have 
expected the emergence of norms to solve a problem with the allocation of scarce 
resources, it didn’t happen.  The city felt compelled to impose a system from above.   
 
54 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, The Institute for Urban Research and Development, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002).   
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 2. Norms Enforced By Long-Term Incentives 
 
One of the primary proponents of the social capital theory of social norms is Eric 
Posner.  He argues that a social norm is the product of a signaling game in which people 
engage in behavioral regularities.  In doing so, people incur a short term cost.  They do 
this in order to show that they have low discount rates, that is, they value future trades a 
lot.   This makes them appear to be desirable partners in cooperative endeavors, since 
cheaters are too present-oriented to sacrifice something in the short term for a gain in the 
future.  The cooperator incurs this short term cost for the sake of a long term gain from 
cooperation.   
Of course, only behavioral regularities that are costly and observable can 
accomplish this.  Posner recounts the practice of gift-giving in the world of business.  
Business people incur a short-term cost of buying flowers for an employee on executive 
assistant’s day or taking a client out to a ball game not because there is an immediate 
return to the bottom line.  Rather, they do this because its obvious costliness demonstrates 
a commitment to the long term cooperative relationship.55 The message an individual 
tries to send by conforming to these costly behavioral regularities is, “I won’t stab you in 
the back at the first opportunity.  I’m in this for the long haul.”  Under Posner’s theory, 
adherence to costly norms that would otherwise appear irrational, are actually quite 
rational, since in the absence of perfect information, signaling is the only way to tell 
trustworthy people apart from swindlers. 
Posner’s theory does not explain the rules followed by illegal vendors for 
allocating space on the sidewalk.  First, the identities of the parties on the sidewalk are 
 
55 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 23 (2000). 
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not limited.  It is wide-open.  The costs of becoming a vendor are quite low.  Some 
vendors we spoke to confessed to having been there only a few days or weeks.  Because 
of the high turn-over among many of the vendors, there is less reason for any vendor to 
invest in developing a reputation as a cooperator.  There is little prospect for future gain 
from interaction with other vendors.   
Of course, there is some concern for reputation, primarily among established 
vendors.  A few of the vendors mentioned that they were “respected.”  But “respect” 
tends to be correlated with being on the sidewalk for a long time.  These respected 
vendors never pointed to costs they incurred in the short-term to get that respect.  Rather, 
it was by showing up to the same spot on a regular basis for some period of time that 
brought them respect.  Did that involve a cost?  Yes, but it was followed by an immediate 
benefit derived from selling to non-vendor strangers in the market place.  One does not 
get respect from yielding a spot to someone with a prior claim.  A vendor gets respect 
from working the same spot for a long time.  These are the same people that are holding 
on to their spots.  In other words they are not sacrificing in the short term for the hope of 
some long-term gain from cooperation.  They are maximizing their short-term interests. 
Posner’s theory does not well explain the rule of first possession as it applies to 
established vendors.  It does no better when applied to new vendors.  Two new vendors 
may covet the same spot.  Posner’s theory would suggest that one vendor or the other 
would back down to demonstrate a long-term commitment to some relationship.  This is 
belied by the practice on the street.  The character of the other person is irrelevant in 
resolving a dispute over space.  Those who admitted they backed down never suggested 
that they did so in order to get respect.  Nor is there any evidence these vendors ever 
received any future cooperation by doing so.  Instead, the vendor backed down either 
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because she believed she had not been on the sidewalk long enough or because the other 
person was “crazy.” 
Those who held onto spaces and those who backed down never spoke in terms of 
good versus bad.  Winners said they were respected, but this was due to time on the 
sidewalk.   
 
B.   Sugden’s Game Theory Of Spontaneous Order 
 
Robert Sugden’s theory of spontaneous order offers an alternative explanation for 
sidewalk order.  He argues that order can arise among people spontaneously without the 
help of the state or some other coordinating authority.  Sugden’s theory has lately 
enjoyed more prominence in the law reviews.  Andrea McDowell recently argued that, 
compared to social norms, spontaneous order offers a better explanation for the 
emergence of order among miners during the California Gold Rush.  Similarly, Sugden’s 
theory provides a more complete explanation for order on the sidewalk.  The theory of 
spontaneous order well explains both emergence of a system for allocating vending space 
among illegal vendors, and the inability of the vendors in the legal district to come up 
with one.   
Sugden poses the question “whether, in the absence of any formal system of law, 
self-enforcing rules of property could evolve out of interactions of individuals concerned 
only with their own interests.”56 One might answer this by referring to Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan.  Hobbes argued that men in a “state of nature,” that is without government, “a 
common power to keep them all in awe,” will find themselves in a permanent state of 
 
56 ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION, AND WELFARE 55 (Basil Blackwell 
1986). 
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war.57 War will arise from the fact that inevitably “two men [will] desire the same thing, 
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy,” and they will “become enemies.”58 Further, 
each man will perceive that even “the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest.”59 Rather than back down or cooperate, each is induced to get what he wants 
and keep what he already has by fighting for it to the death.  Men live in “continual fear, 
and [endure the] danger of violent death; and the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.”60 
Sugden concedes that Hobbes’ idea of the state of nature can be a useful model 
for important areas of modern human life, such as where two people each want some 
thing that only one of them can have.61 But Sugden argues that Hobbes’ conclusion is 
entirely too pessimistic because it ignores the possibility that there might arise 
conventions by which disputes over resources may be quickly and peacefully resolved.62 
Sugden proves this in a series of steps, in the first of which he presents a game of hawk-
dove.  Two players compete for possession of a resource.  Each of the players is capable 
of harming the other, so each has something to lose if there is a fight.  A player may 
chose between two alternative strategies:  (1) playing “hawk,” being aggressive and 
trying to win possession of the entirety of the resource, or (2) playing “dove,” backing 
down if their opponent shows any willingness to fight.63 If there is no way to distinguish 
the players—if the game is “symmetrical”—an equilibrium will be reached in which each 
player alternatively adopts “hawk” and “dove” in a certain percentage of encounters.  
Significantly, the two players will sometimes both pick “hawk,” resulting in a fight.  This 
 
57 Id. at 56, quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Ch. 13 (1651). 
58 Id.
59 Id. at 55. 
60 Id. at 56. 
61 Id. at 57. 
62 Id. at 56. 
63 Id. at 59. 
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worst possible outcome is what Hobbes feared would occur between men in the state of 
nature.64 
Sugden recognizes that the game of hawk-dove is limited as a model of real world 
resource conflicts because it is a one-shot game.  In the real world disputes over a 
resource can persist for a lengthy period of time, and the game is played over many 
rounds.  Players suffer each round that fighting endures, but each player also has the 
opportunity to shift strategies – giving up hawk to become dove and concede defeat.  
Because the fighting may last for some time before a player gives up, Sugden calls this 
multi-round variant of the hawk-dove game the “war of attrition.”65 Again, unless there 
is someway to distinguish the players, two players will persist in playing hawk for several 
rounds until “the value of the resource is completely dissipated in fighting.”  This is 
Hobbes’ view of the state of nature. 
Sugden argues that both of these games come out differently if they are 
“asymmetrical.”  In other words, the Hobbesian state of nature may be avoided if there is 
some way for the players to distinguish one another—other than merely identifying the 
other as an opponent—at the outset of the game.  The resource that is the subject of 
dispute may already be more closely associated with one of the two claimants.  If that is 
so, then a convention will arise that assigns the object to that claimant.  One kind of 
association is possession.  In a dispute over a resource, assume that one party is already in 
possession – the “possessor”—and the other party—the “challenger”—seeks to dislodge 
them.  This very prominent, if superficial, asymmetry reflects a deeper asymmetry, for 
two reasons.  First, a party in possession is likely, on average, to value the resource more 
than someone else.  Why else would they take the trouble of carrying it around?  Second, 
 
64 Id. at 61. 
65 Id. at 62. 
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possession confers an advantage in a fight over that resource.  A party is more likely to 
win a fight over a resource if they are not the challenger, but rather the possessor.66 
Possession not only reflects real asymmetries, it is also prominent because of a natural 
human tendency to seek out relations between objects.67 The prominence of the 
asymmetry of possessor and challenger is likely to lead to a convention favoring 
possessors.  Over time possessors will learn to play “hawk” and hold on to those 
resources in their possession and challengers will learn to play “dove” and back down.68 
If the roles of possessor and challenger were always clear, the game would end 
after one round—even if they had the opportunity to play multiple rounds.  That is, the 
result would be the same whether the parties were artificially restricted to playing a 
simple, one-shot game of hawk-dove, or whether they were allowed to play a multi-round 
hawk-dove game—the war of attrition.  Sugden acknowledges, though, that in the real 
world the roles of possessor and challenger are not clear.  Perhaps an individual dropped 
an object on the ground, and a second person picked it up.  Who is the possessor?  
Players “sometimes make mistakes in assigning their roles.”69 Players will assume a role 
but not be completely confident that they have chosen correctly.  Whatever role is chosen 
initially, there are a number of possible levels of “confidence” in that role.  If two 
disputants to a resource have both assumed the role of “possessor,” and hawk-like seek to 
fight to keep the resource, they will “surrender in order of confidence.”70 If the players 
are skillful in assigning their roles, in most cases one player will be fairly confident that 
they are the possessor and the other fairly confident that they are the challenger.  “Such 
 
66 Id. at 90. 
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contests will be settled quickly; there will be a brief fight, and then one player will back 
down.”71 Competing claims to a resource will be resolved without appealing to a higher 
authority. 
 
C.       Sugden’s Theory Offers A More Complete Explanation For The Existence 
Of A System For Allocating Space Among Illegal Vendors 
 
Relative to the norms theories discussed above, Sugden’s theory of spontaneous 
order provides a more complete explanation for the fact that illegal vendors arrived at a 
method of allocating prime vending space on the sidewalk without government 
intervention.  Sugden’s theory would predict that disputes over possession of a given 
piece of valuable vending space on the sidewalk would be resolved by a convention, 
especially a convention that favored possessors over challengers.  This prediction is 
borne out on the sidewalk.  The vendors follow a rule of first possession.  A vendor will 
lay out their wares on parts of the sidewalk that are not already occupied by someone 
else.  Suppose a second vendor hoped to sell from that same spot.  Upon discovering it 
was already occupied, the latecomer would understand that they had no right to that spot, 
and move on.72 
According to Sugden’s theory, this system of allocating vending space to the first 
possessor would also be self-enforcing.  There would be no need to appeal to a higher 
authority to resolve disputes.  This prediction likewise conforms to the facts.  Vending 
from the sidewalk is illegal.  The city has no role in allocating rights to a patch of 
 
71 Id.
72 Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002). 
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sidewalk among competing illegal vendors or enforcing claims.  The vendors have not 
organized to enforce the rule of first possession.  None of the twenty-one vendors we 
spoke with ever indicated that vendors collectively determined space allocation.  There is 
no “vendors’ enforcement committee” that patrols the sidewalk to ensure that first 
possessors retain possession against challengers.  No posses are formed.  No dues are 
collected to support a space sheriff.  No arbitration panel is established to handle 
disputes.  Instead, the system is followed by illegal vendors on an individual or bilateral 
(possessor/challenger) basis. 
Sugden’s theory would further predict that where disputants were uncertain as to 
their roles, the party least confident that they were in fact the “possessor” would 
surrender first.  This squares with what happens on the sidewalk.  Unlike shopkeepers, 
sidewalk vendors are unable to lock-up their spots when they leave for the evening.  The 
sidewalk is open to all.  When vendors depart the sidewalk at the end of the day they take 
all of their belongings with them.  Like the proverbial slate being wiped clean, the 
sidewalk is freed from possession by sidewalk vendors.  The next day vendors start over 
again.  Whoever gets to a spot first that day gets to retain possession against a challenger, 
even if the challenger occupied that same spot the day before.73 
But what happens if application of the rule of first possession is unclear in a given 
situation?  Suppose a vendor manages to get to the same spot first day after day for 
several months.  She might come to believe that this spot is hers, and not just for the day.  
The vendor might claim that she has acquired some more durable right to that piece of 
sidewalk.  In the language of the street, she is “established.”  Her claim would be based 
not on the fact that she was first that day, but rather because she had been there first for a 
 
73 Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002). 
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period stretching over several days.  If one day she showed up at “her” site only to find it 
occupied by a newcomer, what would the established vendor do?  In the language of 
Sugden’s theory, both the newcomer and the established vendor might believe themselves 
to be the possessor.  A fight, not necessarily physical, would ensue.  The vendor who was 
less “confident” in her role as “possessor” would eventually back down and move on. 
Is there any way to predict which of the two vendors claiming to be the rightful 
“possessor” is less confident and thus likely to back down first?  Sugden’s theory offers 
some help.  Awarding property to the possessor is a convention in part because of the 
tendency for those in possession of an object to value it more than others, and thus be 
more willing to fight to retain it.74 In other words, possession is good, objective evidence 
of willingness to fight.  Taking possession of a vending spot first on any particular day is 
evidence that that vendor puts some value in that spot and would be willing to fight to 
retain it.  But if an established vendor has been selling from the same spot on a regular 
basis for years, they must place a very high value on that spot.  Why else would they have 
gone to the trouble of being first each day for such a long period of time?  Being 
established is objective evidence that a vendor highly values a spot and thus is highly 
motivated to fight to retain it.  So the new vendor is likely to be relatively less confident 
in her role as the “possessor,” and after some amount of fighting back down and move 
on. 
With this refinement, Sugden’s theory appears to fit real world practices of 
sidewalk vending fairly well.  This is especially so with respect to the durable rights to a 
spot enjoyed by “established” vendors.  The illegal vendors we spoke with had worked 
the sidewalk on the Strip for a variety of periods, ranging from as little as a few days to as 
 
74 ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION, AND WELFARE 90 (Basil Blackwell 
1986). 
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long as fifteen years.  Three of them claimed to have prevailed in a dispute with another 
vendor over rights to sell from a particular place on the sidewalk.  Each of the three 
“hawks” had her own spot.75 Each hawk was a full time vendor, selling from her spot 
most days of the week.  Most importantly for Sugden’s theory, these hawks had been 
selling from their respective spots for “years.”76 By contrast, four of the vendors we 
spoke with admitted to having backed down in a dispute over vending space.  None of 
them had been working the Strip for more than six months.  So when it comes to 
predicting that long-term, “established” vendors would prevail in disputes over vending 
spaces they had regularly possessed for at least a year, Sugden’s theory appears dead on. 
It is clear that new challengers lose against possessors who are long-term, 
established vendors.  How do new challengers fare against short-term, new vendors in 
possession?  Four new vendors told us that they did have possession of a spot only to 
back down when challenged.  If the challengers were long-term, established vendors 
simply asserting their superior rights of first possession over the spot, then Sugden’s 
theory would be confirmed.  But I thought it would be impractical to interview both the 
“hawk” and “dove” to any dispute (all of which occurred before I got to the sidewalk), 
and I did not attempt it.  So it is possible that these successful hawk/challengers were 
themselves new vendors with no better claim to the spot than the new vendors they had 
 
75 Interview with mamomes vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh 
Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with pastry vendor on the sidewalk at the 
north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); 
Interview with necklace vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
76 Interview with mamomes vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh 
Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with pastry vendor on the sidewalk at the 
north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Seventh Avenue, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); 
Interview with necklace vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
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succeeded in displacing.  Is there any evidence to suggest the existence of rule of first 
possession that protected not just established vendors, but new vendors too? 
Sugden’s prediction that new vendors in possession would prevail against new 
challengers is supported by other facts.  Newer vendors repeatedly said that the rule was 
“first come, first served.”  Whoever occupied a patch of sidewalk first on any particular 
day had a right (with respect to other vendors) to sell from that spot for the rest of the 
day.77 Two separate new vendors stated specifically that they would yield to the vendor 
who arrived first that day.  If on a given day they arrived at their spot and found that it 
was already taken, they simply moved on.78 One experienced vendor asserted that 
disputes between vendors are rare.79 Of the twenty-one illegal vendors we spoke with, 
two-thirds claimed never to have been involved in a dispute over a vending location.   
When new vendors surrendered a spot in possession to a challenger, it remains 
possible that the challenger was not an established vendor but rather another new vendor 
 
77 Interview with billfold and hat vendor on the sidewalk on the east side of Alvarado Street, between 
Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002); Interview with 
videocassette vendor on the sidewalk on the east side of Alvarado Street, half-way between Sixth Street and 
Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002); Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the 
sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, 
California (July 10, 2002); Interview with watch and videocassette vendor, on the sidewalk east of 
Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 
2002); Interview with jewelry vendor, on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002); Interview with incense vendor on the 
sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California 
(July 21, 2002); Interview with vendor of batteries, cigarettes, and toys on the sidewalk at the north-east 
corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview 
with cigarette vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with necklace and coyote skin vendor on the sidewalk 
at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 
2002); Interview with videocassette and portable radio vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of 
Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with 
necklace vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los 
Angeles, California (July 21, 2002); Interview with ring vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of 
Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
78 Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002); Interview with necklace and coyote 
skin vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los 
Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) 
79 Interview with sunglasses vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and 
Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 9, 2002). 
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with no superior claim.  But these kinds of disputes are rare in any event.  Even if new 
vendors were the ones doing the challenging, they are so few in number that they may be 
viewed as deviants and exceptions to the rule of first possession. 
 
D.   The Existence Of An Informal System For Allocating Sidewalk Space    
 Among Illegal Vendors Is Not Explained By The Presence Of Street Gangs 
 
The Strip and the surrounding neighborhood are home to active street gangs.  
Rather than Sugden’s theory, might not the presence of these street gangs be the best 
explanation for the existence of a system of allocating vending space on the sidewalk?  
Might not gangs constitute a kind of private government that can impose order on the 
sidewalk from above?  While this gang government view has some adherents, I think it is 
not well supported by the evidence. 
Los Angeles is home to more than 1300 street gangs, whose members number 
more than 150,000.80 The city’s gangs have been known to charge sidewalk vendors 
“rent” for the privilege to vend.81 In one neighborhood, not MacArthur Park, gang 
members went so far as to use orange spray paint to designate makeshift sidewalk stalls 
so they could more readily “identify their targets.”82 Four street gangs vie for territory in 
the MacArthur Park neighborhood.83 The subject of my empirical research – the Strip – 
 
80 Kathy Braidhill, Where The BoyZ Are, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE, January 1998, at p. 63 (map) 
81 Interview with Officer Alexander Bautista, Los Angeles Police Department, Rampart Patrol Division, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 24, 2002); Cf. Kathy Braidhill, Where The BoyZ Are, LOS ANGELES 
MAGAZINE, January 1998, at 65 (downtown Los Angeles street gang “collect[s] a ‘tax’ for allowing the 
women [prostitutes] to work ‘their’ street corners”). 
82 Marc Lacey, Extortion Patrols Hit Streets On Foot, Bikes, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, December 28, 
1992, Metro, Part B, at 1. 
83 Interview with Officer Alexander Bautista, Los Angeles Police Department, Rampart Patrol Division, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 24, 2002); Kathy Braidhill, Where The BoyZ Are, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE,
January 1998, at 64 (map). 
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is divided between two gangs.  According to a gang member who approached us, 
Alvarado Street running north from Wilshire Boulevard is controlled by one gang,84 
apparently the “18th Street Gang.”85 Alvarado Street running south from Wilshire 
Boulevard is controlled by a different gang, likely the “Crazy Riders,” or possibly the 
“Mara Salvatrucha.”86 (See map.) 
There is evidence that the vendors operating in the southern half of the Strip are 
charged rent by the gang whose territory encompasses it.  A police officer assigned to the 
area was aware that gangs had done this four years before my study was conducted, but 
believed the practice had largely been discontinued in the face of heavier police presence 
in the park and surrounding neighborhood.  But the vendors had a different perspective.  
Two different vendors shared with us their understanding that members of the street gang 
that assumed control of Alvarado Street south of Wilshire Boulevard charged illegal 
vendors $10 or $20 per week “rent.”87 Legal vendors in the MacArthur Park district also 
 
84 Interview with gang member on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002).  The gang member approached my assistant and 
asked her why we were interviewing sidewalk vendors.  Upon learning of our purpose, he gave us 
“permission” to continue in his gang’s territory.  Id. 
85 Interview with Officer Alexander Bautista, Los Angeles Police Department, Rampart Patrol Division, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 24, 2002); Kathy Braidhill, Where The BoyZ Are, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE,
January 1998, at 64 (map). 
86 Interview with vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (street gang south of Wilshire charges Alvarado 
Street vendors rent, but gang north of Wilshire does not); Interview with vendor on the sidewalk at the 
north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) 
(street gang south of Wilshire charges Alvarado Street vendors rent).  See Interview with Officer Alexander 
Bautista, Los Angeles Police Department, Rampart Patrol Division, in Los Angeles, California (July 24, 
2002) (Crazy Riders and Mara Salvatrucha vie for territory south-west of the park); Kathy Braidhill, Where 
The BoyZ Are, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE, January 1998, at 64 (map) (Crazy Riders and Mara Salvatrucha 
have territory on either side of Alvarado Street south of Seventh Street). 
87 Interview with vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire 
Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (the “pandilleros” south of Wilshire charge vendors 
$10 to $20 per week); Interview with vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street 
and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (the “cholos” south of Wilshire charge 
vendors $20 per week). 
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sold from the sidewalk south of Wilshire (on the other side of Alvarado Street), and they 
likewise complained that gang members demanded rent from them, too.88 
Charging rent is one thing, but assigning vendors to particular spaces is quite 
another.  The evidence of a street gang-directed formal system for allocating space on the 
sidewalk is equivocal.  Claims that gangs charge vendors for the use of particular spots 
were made to me by two individuals.89 One, a city employee involved in the enforcement 
of the prohibition on sidewalk vending, based his claim on the fact that he repeatedly saw 
individual vendors selling from the same place on the sidewalk day after day.  In other 
words, it appeared that he, much like Thomas Hobbes, assumed that in a state of nature 
order could be imposed only from above.  Because it was not being provided by the city, 
the order on the sidewalk must have been provided by the only other potential sovereign, 
a local street gang.90 The other person who alleged that gangs charge vendors for the use 
of particular spots is an administrator with the IURD, which runs the legal vending 
district in the park.  She claimed that in exchange for rent, street gangs protected a 
vendor’s right to use their space with bodyguards and lookouts.  But she stopped short of 
asserting that gangs are the one assigning spots to begin with.91 In other words, even if 
the street gangs charged vendors rent and enforced the rights of individual vendors to use 
of their space, it does not follow that gangs were responsible for assigning spaces in the 
first instance.  These tasks are distinct. 
 
88 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, The Institute for Urban Research and Development, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002).  The legal vendors refused, citing the fact that they had already 
paid the city for a license to vend there.  Id.
89 Interview with Samuel Portillo, Senior Building Mechanical Inspector, Pro-Active Code Enforcement 
(“PACE”), City of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, in Los Angeles, California (July 24, 
2002); Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research 
and Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002). 
90 Interview with Samuel Portillo, Senior Building Mechanical Inspector, Pro-Active Code Enforcement 
(“PACE”), City of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, in Los Angeles, California (July 24, 
2002). 
91 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (July 23, 2002). 
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The theory that gangs assigned spaces to vendors is further undercut by evidence 
that the territory embraced by the Strip was at that time divided between two rival gangs, 
only one of which charged vendors rent.  The Strip north of Wilshire fell within the 
territory of the 18th Street Gang, which by all street level accounts did not charge rent.  
Lacking a revenue stream from vending per se, it is unlikely that members of the 18th 
Street Gang would go to the trouble of assigning spaces to the vendors.  The rule of first 
possession described by vendors in the area where rent was charged did not appear to be 
significantly different from the rule of first possession in the area that was rent-free .  In 
both areas there were vendors who claimed the rule on the street was “first come, first 
served.”  In both there were disputes that arose between “established” vendors who 
played hawk, and new vendors who played dove.  Whatever impact the rent-collecting 
gang south of Wilshire had on vending there, it seems unlikely that it made a difference 
in the way in which vendors allocated spaces.     
 
E. Sugden’s Theory Also Sheds Light On Why The Legal Vendors Were Unable 
To Devise A Way To Allocate Vending Space In The Legal Zone 
 
Across the street from the Strip, the city of Los Angeles established a legal 
vending district on sidewalks bordering MacArthur Park.  In dramatic contrast to their 
illegal counterparts, who devised an informal approach to space allocation, the legal 
vendors there were unable to come up with anything on their own.  Even after ten 
meetings, the less than twenty legal vendors could not agree on a means of allocating 
vending space in the MacArthur Park vending district.  Instead space was allocated by the 
IURD, acting on behalf of the city, and imposed formally.  Sugden’s theory explains why 
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order arose spontaneously among illegal vendors on the Strip.  Does it also explain why 
this did not come to pass among legal vendors across the street? 
Sugden argues that disputes over property are resolved according to conventions 
that exploit existing associations between claimants and objects.  Conventions favor 
possession.  One problem with the legal vending district arose out of the fact that there 
was no vendor “in possession” before the district opened.  Prior to opening day none of 
the legal vendors were selling from sidewalks in the park.  There were no prior 
associations between vendors and spots that could form the basis for legal space 
assignments.  Each vendor was new to the district.  In Sugden’s language, the game 
appeared symmetrical.  Some spots were more valuable than others, but there was no way 
similarly to distinguish among competing claimants.   
The IURD feared that if left on their own, the legal vendors would eventually 
adopt a rule of first possession.  It is not clear why the IURD thought this was such a bad 
thing.  The district was being opened all at once.  Perhaps the IURD imagined that the 
“opening day” feature of the district combined with a first possession rule would lead to a 
stampede reminiscent of the Oklahoma Land Rush of 1889.  Whatever the reason, the 
rule of first possession was not considered by the IURD to be a desirable rule.  Because 
there was no other way to distinguish among competing vendor-claimants, no informal 
system developed.   
 
42
IV. The Informal Method Of Allocating Space Among Illegal Vendors’ Is 
Superior To The Formal Method Used By Legal Vendors 
 
It remains to be determined whether either the formal or informal system for 
allocating sidewalk space among vendors is preferable.  One way to measure this is to 
test certain prominent theories of property rights evolution against each system.  These 
theories include wealth maximization, associated with Harold Demsetz, and the 
competing theories of distribution and ideology. 
In this section I argue that the system of sidewalk space allocation adopted 
spontaneously by the illegal vendors is better explained by Demsetz’s theory of wealth 
maximization than by competing theories of distribution or ideology.  Specifically, I 
contend that increases in demand for sidewalk space lead to privatization of rights to use 
the sidewalk.  This privatization took place in order to facilitate the internalization of 
beneficial effects that flow from the activities of individual vendors.  The development of 
these private rights is socially desirable because it minimizes the sum of allocative and 
administrative costs.  Stated another way, the increase in value of the sidewalk brought 
about by the system for space allocation outweighs the administrative costs of this 
sidewalk property regime. 
The informal system for allocating space on the sidewalk that was adopted by the 
illegal vendors contrasts sharply with the formal system adopted by the city with respect 
to legal vending, which for several years was administered in the legal vending district 
across the street.  Far from being wealth maximizing, the city’s approach is better 
explained by a theory of distribution.  This difference is consistent with a hypothesis 
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advanced by Terry Anderson and Peter Hill, that homogenous groups are more likely to 
adopt wealth maximizing rules than more centralized political processes.92 
A. The Illegal Vendors’ Informal System Conforms To A Wealth Maximization 
Theory Of Property 
 
In his classic piece, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Harold Demsetz argued 
that property rights are created in order to facilitate the “the internalization of harmful 
and beneficial effects” on actors.  Demsetz claimed that property rights regimes evolve in 
response to changes in demand and technology, generally in the direction of more 
privatization.  He contended that this was by and large a good thing for society as a 
whole, since property rules would be adopted only if the cost of administering them were 
exceeded by the allocative benefits they carried with them.93 The informal system for 
allocating scarce sidewalk space conforms well to this wealth maximization theory of 
property. 
 
1. The Illegal Vendors’ System Enjoys A Number Of Allocative And 
Administrative Efficiencies 
 
The general rule for allocating sidewalk space among illegal vendors is first 
come, first served.  This rule is, of course, not unique to the sidewalk.  It applies with 
 
92 Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S489 (2002) (smaller, 
more homogeneous groups are more likely to adopt wealth maximizing property rules than centralized 
political processes). 
93 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Paper & Proc. 347, 347-350 
(1967).     
44
respect to a number of other resources, including wild animals94 and parking spaces on 
public streets.95 It also applied to oil and gas in the early days of their development in the 
United States,96 and to mining claims during the California Gold Rush.97 In their study of 
the California Gold Rush, Richard Zerbe and Leigh Anderson reported how the rule of 
first come, first served in allocating mining claims resulted in a number of local 
efficiencies.98 The rule of first possession used by Los Angeles’ illegal vendors today 
enjoys some of these same efficiencies, as well as some others. 
The rule of first possession of vending spaces enjoys four allocative efficiencies.99 
First, it encourages the early discovery of valuable vending sites.100 The vendor who 
arrives at an open space on the sidewalk before other vendors arrive that day will gain a 
right to sell from that spot for the rest of the day.  If that vendor arrives at that same space 
first on a regular basis for several months, the vendor will gain durable right to sell from 
it.  They will be freed from having to get there first on any particular day.  By rewarding 
discoverers, vendors are encouraged quickly to seek out valuable vending locations. 
Second, the rule of first possession likely puts a given piece of sidewalk space 
into the hands of the vendor who values it most.  Richard Epstein observed a similar 
phenomenon among users of space by a swimming pool or at the beach.  There those who 
 
94 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Supreme Court 1805). 
95 Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation Of The Commons:  Parking On Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S515 (2002) (empirical study of informal rules for parking on public streets in Chicago, IL). 
96 Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W.2d 204 (1934). 
97 Richard O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the 
California Gold Fields, 61 J. Econ. Hist. 114, 133 (2001). 
98 Id. at 135. 
99 An economy for which the mix of goods and services cannot be altered to make consumers better off is 
known as “allocatively efficient.” A private choice or government policy will be said to increase allocative 
efficiency if it gives its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it takes away from its victims. The 
allocative cost of an economic action is its opportunity cost, that is, the allocative value that the resources 
the action consumers would have generated in their actual alternative uses. 
100 Cf. Richard O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in 
the California Gold Fields, 61 J. Econ. Hist. 114, 135 (2001) (“The first-come procedure encourages 
further, and faster, discovery of gold, as it encourages the mining of gold before others arrive”). 
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arrive first are allowed to claim a spot with a towel, and their space is “generally 
respected for the day.”101 Epstein reasoned that this was a satisfactory way to allocate 
space in part because “it is likely that the earlier users on each particular day will, all 
things equal, make more intensive use of their place.”102 The situation is similar among 
vendors on the sidewalk.  Those who arrive at the sidewalk earlier in the day are more 
likely to make more intensive, or valuable, use of the property than latecomers. 
The third allocative efficiency the vendors’ rule of first possession stems from the 
fact that it rewards the specialized knowledge earlier vendors gain from selling from a 
particular location.103 Even over the course of a single day, a vendor may learn how to 
hawk their wares more effectively from a particular location.  The vendor might find that 
potential customers tend to approach from one direction as opposed to another, or that 
certain products sell better when displayed adjacent to certain other products.  For an 
established vendor the knowledge is likely to become even more refined and valuable.  
After selling from one spot for several months a vendor would probably learn what 
products sell best, at what prices, and at what times of the day or week.   
The vendors’ rule of first possession results in a fourth allocative efficiency:  
business good will.  In the familiar world of traditional storefront merchants, big box 
retailers, and fast food franchisees, it is well understood that a business is worth more 
than just its assets.  A certain amount of its value rests on the firm’s reputation and 
relationship with its customers.  The same is true for the business enterprises of sidewalk 
vendors.  As a vendor becomes established, she will develop a reputation among potential 
 
101 Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation Of The Commons:  Parking On Public Roads, 31 J. Legal Stud. 
S515, S527 (2002). 
102 Id. at S528. 
103 Cf. Richard O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in 
the California Gold Fields, 61 J. Econ. Hist. 114, 135 (2001) (“The first-come procedure . . . recognizes 
that the earliest miners would develop special knowledge about particular claim sites”) 
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customers.  Her reputation will be based on not only what she sells, but also where she 
sells.  The customer will come to associate that vendor with her “spot.”104 This 
reputation has value because it communicates information to potential customers, making 
it easier for them to find the vendor and engage in wealth generating trades.  The longer a 
vendor successfully sells from one location, the more valuable this place-based reputation 
becomes.   
This business good will is not completely portable.  If an established vendor were 
to cease selling from her spot, and try from another location, some of her good will would 
be lost.  She would be starting over.  It would take some time for customers to associate 
her with a new spot.  Nor is one vendor’s good will easily transferred to another.  If an 
established vendor were to be displaced by a newcomer, some of the good will enjoyed 
by the established vendor would be lost.  Even if the newcomer sold the same products, 
some customers might turn away, not wanting to do business with them.  By enabling 
vendors to become “established” and obtain durable rights to spots, the vendors’ rule of 
first possession preserves business good will. 
The rule for allocating sidewalk space based on first possession also enjoys three 
administrative efficiencies.  First, it minimizes the costs that are incurred when the 
vendor that arrives first on a given day is forced to gather their things and find a new 
 
104 Berestein, For Vendors, the Wheels Turn Slowly, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Jan. 15, 1995, City Times, 
at 12 (explaining that fruit vendor sells from same intersection every day); Beyette, Vendors vs. the Law - 
Unlicensed Street Merchants: Able Entrepreneurs or Nuisances?, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, June 27, 
1990, at E1 (stating that tamale vendors operate at "their spot," and a vendor's "makeshift stand was a 
fixture at Seventh and Alvarado"); Family Album Deck: Daniel and Reynalda Cruz, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
1999, at 1 (explaining that licensed vendor in Santa Ana, California, has been selling fruit from the same 
corner for a decade); Julianne Malveaux, Street Vendors' Lament, THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 4, 
1995, at B2 (asserting that vendors are pressured by the free market to find and keep "the right spot to sell 
from," making some vendors "as permanent (and as dependable) as large department stores"); Sebastian 
Rotella, Peru's Poor See Lessons in Standoff, L.A. Times, Home Edition, Jan. 4, 1997, at 2 (explaining that 
vendor has operated from the same spot for ten years); Tracy Wilkinson, Street Vendors' Leader Arrested 
on Issue of Untaxed Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Feb. 15, 1992, Metro, Part B, at 3 (describing 
how illegal vendor arrested by Los Angeles police while selling from her "traditional spot"). 
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spot.105 These costs can be significant for some kinds of merchandise.  We saw vendors 
of jewelry and compact discs spend several minutes carefully laying out their goods for 
display.  If another vendor were to come along, these goods would have to be gathered 
up, moved, and carefully laid out somewhere else.  With respect to disputes over vending 
space among unestablished, or “new,” vendors, the rule of first possession eliminates 
these costs entirely.  The first vendor to occupy a spot on any given day has a right to 
remain there for the rest of the day.  That first vendor need not relocate when another new 
vendor arrives later and covets the same spot.  The result may be different, though, when 
a dispute over vending space arises between a new vendor and an established vendor.  An 
established vendor may arrive at her spot one day only to find it occupied by a new 
vendor.  The vendors’ rule of first possession gives priority to the established vendor, and 
the new vendor must relocate.  The costs of relocation in this instance, though, seem 
outweighed by the allocative benefits.  The established vendor has built up specialized 
knowledge and good will in that spot.  This value would be lost if a new vendor were 
allowed to supplant the established one just by showing up on the sidewalk early one day.  
The costs of relocation are not completely eliminated by the vendors’ rule of first 
possession.  But the costs that do remain seem justified. 
The rule of first possession on the sidewalk bears a second administrative 
efficiency.  It is a fairly simple rule to administer.  New vendors facing off on the 
sidewalk know exactly where they stand.  The one who arrived at the spot first gets to 
stay there for the rest of the day.  It is a little more complicated if the dispute is between a 
new vendor and an established vendor who wants to displace them and sell from their 
 
105 Cf. Richard O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in 
the California Gold Fields, 61 J. Econ. Hist. 114, 135 (2001) (“The first-come procedure . . . obviates the 
need for the earlier miners to resettle”). 
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usual spot.  Some time will undoubtedly be spent by the claimants determining whether 
the party claiming to be established is telling the truth.  There is of course a risk of error.  
The new vendor who backed down and relocated when confronted by an “established” 
vendor may have been duped.   
Another reason why the first possession rule used by the vendors is 
administratively efficient is because it is self-enforcing.  Vendors need not call upon a 
third party to enforce a rightful claim.  Disputes are infrequent.  Only a third of the 
twenty-one vendors we spoke with claimed to have been a party to a dispute over 
vending space.  Those who claimed to have won these disputes said that they were 
“respected.”  From this one might assume that the winners had made some appeal to 
other vendors on the sidewalk to come to their aid and enforce the rule of first possession.  
But none of the winners said this.  Instead the winners seemed simply to have held their 
ground.  When they speak of “respect,” it appears to refer more to a sense of entitlement 
to use the sidewalk.  “Respect” means that an established vendor’s entitlement is 
recognized by the second party who makes a competing claim and then backs down.  It 
also refers to self-respect, in the sense that an established vendor would be willing to 
stand up to an interloper to maintain their right to sell from their spot. 
 
2. The Illegal Vendors’ Informal System Has Not Over-Propertized 
The Sidewalk 
 
Demsetz’s theory that property rights evolve based on cost-benefit principles is 
affirmed not only by the fact that a property rights regime has emerged for allocating 
valuable space among illegal vendors on the sidewalk.   His theory is also affirmed by the 
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fact that this regime is far simpler than the one that exists for many other highly valuable 
resources.  In other words, the costs of the illegal vendors’ informal system do not 
outweigh its benefits. 
Demand for sidewalk vending spaces in Los Angeles increased over the 1980s 
and 1990s.106 This made the sidewalk relatively more valuable.  But a number of factors 
have limited the value of the sidewalk for purposes of vending.  Many vendors are not 
established and have no desire to become established either.107 Some are between jobs in 
the formal economy.108 One vendor we spoke with said she was a student.109 These 
temporary vendors are looking for some quick cash on the sidewalk, and are not 
interested in developing a more valuable long-term vending enterprise. 
Even for those vendors who want to become, or already are, established, the value 
of the sidewalk is still quite limited.  There exist a number of substitutes for vending from 
 
106 See Leslie Berestein et al., Wheeling and Dealing; Street Vendors Risk Citations and the Ire of Other 
Merchants as They Try to Eke Out a Living, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Feb. 2, 1995, at J12 (stating that 
sidewalk vending "proliferated after a surge in Latin American immigration"); Penelope McMillan, Street 
Vendors - In Between a Rock and a Hard Place, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Dec. 23, 1988, Metro, 2, at 1 
("What we're seeing in the streets of Central Los Angeles is a dramatic increase in street vending."); James 
Rainey, L.A. Looks For Palatable Solution to Street Vending, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Dec. 9, 1993, at 
A1 ("The immigration boom and simultaneous contraction of the job market have resulted in a dramatic 
increase in street merchants.") Raymond L. Sanchez, Street Vendors Pay High Price for Unlicensed Trade 
in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Oct. 26, 1987, Metro, 2, at 1(stating that, in the MacArthur Park 
neighborhood, "police began enforcing the law against street sales about six months ago [in April 1987] 
after area business owners complained that "the problem with vendors was getting totally out of hand'").  
Between 1987 and 1992, the number of illegal sidewalk vendors in Los Angeles grew from 1000 to 4000.  
Raymond L. Sanchez, Street Vendors Pay High Price for Unlicensed Trade in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Home 
Edition, Oct. 26, 1987, Metro, 2, at 1; Plan to Legalize Street Vending Comes Under Fire, L.A. TIMES,
Home Edition, Jan. 14, 1992, Metro, Part B, at 2. 
107 Interviews with vendors on the east side of Alvarado Street between Wilshire Boulevard and Seventh 
Street, in Los Angeles, California (July 9, 10, and 21, 2002) (of 21 illegal vendors interviewed, 8 indicated 
that they had another occupation). 
108 Interview with tennis shoe vendor on the sidewalk east of Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard 
and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002) (he started vending full time a week 
earlier because he lost his job); Interview with watch and video cassette vendor on the sidewalk east of 
Alvarado Street, between Wilshire Boulevard and the Metro entrance, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 
2002) (she’s been vending for 3 months because she has no work); Interview with videocassette and 
portable radio vendor on the sidewalk at the north-east corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, 
in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002) (he began selling 2 months earlier because he has no job). 
109 Interview with vendor of shampoo, batteries, lighters, and cigarettes on the sidewalk at the north-east 
corner of Alvarado Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 21, 2002). 
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the sidewalk, including selling from indoor swap meets, flea markets, and traditional 
storefront shops.  In comparison with these substitutes, vending from the sidewalk suffers 
from a number of disadvantages.  Sidewalk vending is illegal.  Government enforcement 
of the prohibition has been sporadic.  Even when the police come, some vendors have 
been inclined to grab their belongings, run, and return another day.110 But the risk of 
police enforcement of the prohibitions against sidewalk vending and public nuisances has 
discouraged even the most dedicated vendors from investing in fixed improvements.   
All things being equal, an established vendor might want to sell from a permanent 
stall on the sidewalk.  This would enable her and perhaps her customers to escape the 
weather.  Even a modest permanent structure might give a vendor a secure place to 
display merchandise and store it overnight.  Rather than having to lug unsold 
merchandise to and from the sidewalk each day, the vendor could simply lock it up on the 
sidewalk each night.  And during the day, a vendor could afford to market more 
merchandise and over a larger area of the sidewalk, since in a secure set of display cases 
her goods would be less subject to theft.  But the very feature that makes fixed 
improvements so attractive as a protection against theft makes them vulnerable to seizure 
by city authorities.  A vendor can run away with her box of shampoo.  She cannot take a 
fixed stall with her.  
So sidewalk vendors are left with selling in the open air.  Vulnerable to weather, 
vendors must limit the number and kinds of goods they hawk.  These marketing choices 
are further limited by the higher risk of theft.  This risk also compels each vendor to 
 
110 Interview with vendor of sliced fruit on the sidewalk on the east side of Alvarado Street, half-way 
between Sixth Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, California (July 10, 2002) (when the police 
come she runs away with her wheeled cart); Interview with videocassette vendor on the sidewalk on the 
east side of Alvarado Street, half-way between Sixth Street and Wilshire Boulevard, in Los Angeles, 
California (July 10, 2002) (when the police approach, he runs away). 
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collect her goods and remove them from the sidewalk at the end of every day.  As a 
platform for selling goods then, the public sidewalk’s value is limited.   
The limited nature of the sidewalk’s value is especially apparent when one 
considers the advantages of selling from an indoor swap meet or any of the traditional 
store fronts that exist next to the sidewalk on the Strip and throughout the city.  Those 
merchants are much better secured against the weather and theft, and the risk of the state 
removing a merchant’s business is dramatically less.  Even adjusting for differences in 
size, a store front business is more valuable than vending space on the sidewalk next to 
it.111 
Demsetz argued that property rights are transformed in response to changes in 
technology and demand.112 A corollary of this thesis might be that, all other things being 
equal, where one resource is more valuable than another, the more valuable resource will 
enjoy more property rights activity.  Property rights activity must be cost justified.  If a 
resource has relatively low value, it will not enjoy a great deal of property rights 
definition.  A given resource will be the subject of only that level of property rights 
definition that is justified in light of the resource-related benefits that may be derived 
from it.  Because the sidewalk has less value than the store fronts adjacent to it, 
Demsetz’s cost benefit theory of property rights evolution would predict that there would 
be less property rights activity on the sidewalk.  This theory is confirmed by the facts. 
Stated generally, the core rights of property are the rights to use, exclude, and 
transfer.   The rules relating to each of these rights is much more rich and elaborate with 
 
111 See Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 30-31 
(2004) (elaborating argument). 
112 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPER & PROC. 347, 350 
(1967) (“the emergence of new private or state-owned property will be in response to changes in 
technology and relative prices”). 
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respect to store front businesses than it is in the illegal vendors’ regime for sidewalk 
vending space.  Consider first the right of use.  Through first possession, sidewalk 
vendors get the right to use their spaces to sell goods.  There may be a restriction on 
selling products that do not directly compete with either an adjacent merchant or 
vendor.113 But that is as elaborate as the vendors’ property regime gets with respect to 
use.  This regime is quite simple compared to the one that exists on property containing 
storefront businesses.  There the law contemplates rights to use being divided temporally, 
such as between a landlord and a tenant.  The law of property may also more precisely 
define the contours of a right to use.  For example, a merchant’s right to modify the 
appearance of a storefront may be limited by the common law doctrine of waste114 or 
provisions in their lease.115 
Similar differences exist between the sidewalk and traditional storefront shops 
with respect to the right to exclude.  Under the property regime embraced by them, each 
illegal sidewalk vendor gets the right to exclude other vendors from selling from her spot.  
The right to exclude enjoyed by store front merchants and other landowners are defined 
in greater detail.  For example, a merchant may be restricted in their ability to exclude a 
 
113 Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2004). 
114 A tenant’s duty not to commit waste is breached if tenant makes “such a change as to affect a vital and 
substantial portion of the premises; as would change its characteristic appearance; the fundamental purpose 
of the relation; or the uses contemplated, or a change of such a nature, as would affect the very realty itself, 
extraordinary in scope and effect, or unusual in expenditure.”  Pross v. Excelsior Cleaning and Dyeing Co., 
110 Misc. 195, 201, N.Y.S. 176, 179-180 (Mun. Ct. 1919) 
115 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Let’s Frame It, Inc., 759 P.2d 819 (Colo. App. 1988) (fire damage 
exception to tenant’s covenant to repair held inapplicable to fire caused by tenant’s negligence when other 
lease provisions required tenant to repair damage resulting from its negligence). 
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customer116 or another party that holds a legally recognized interest in the property, such 
as a tenant in common or landlord.117 
It is not clear whether illegal vendors have a right to transfer their interest in a 
spot.  There were instances when one vending spot was being operated by more than one 
person.  Perhaps this was a way to transfer a vending spot from one vendor to another:  a 
vendor who planned to leave would bring in another vendor to work together for a time.  
Transfers of interests in storefront businesses are much more complicated.  Among other 
things, a writing with certain language is generally required, and it is advisable to visit 
the recorder’s office and perform a title search before buying. 118 
The system for allocating space among illegal sidewalk vendors appears to fit 
well with a number of the components of Demsetz’s well-maximization theory of 
property.  Property rights in the sidewalk did arise at about the time the demand for 
vending space increased to the point that conditions of scarcity existed with respect to the 
most valuable spots.  The property rights evolved towards greater privatization, as first 
possession principles were applied so that exclusive usufructory rights were recognized 
in individual vendors.  Finally, the property rights regime is cost-justified.  The allocative 
efficiencies brought about by the vendors’ system for allocating sidewalk space 
outweighs its administrative costs.  The higher administrative costs that would be 
incurred in a property regime with more elaborate features are not justified in light of the 
limited value of the sidewalk for selling goods.  As Demsetz’s theory would predict, 
those added features have not been adopted by illegal vendors on the sidewalk. 
 
116 Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982) (casino patron enjoys a 
common law right of reasonable access). 
117 Spiller v. Mackreth, 334 So.2d 859 (Ala. 1976) (cotenant in possession would be liable to cotenants out 
of possession for value of his use and occupation of the property if the cotenants actually sought to occupy 
the property but were excluded by the cotenant in possession). 
118 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 611, 661 (5th ed. Aspen Law and Business 2002). 
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B. The Illegal Vendors’ Method of Allocating Space Does Not Conform To 
Theories Of Property That Are Either Distributional or Ideological 
 
Having demonstrated that the property rights regime adopted by illegal vendors is 
well-explained by all aspects of Demsetz’s wealth maximization theory, it remains to be 
seen whether it is also consistent with another theory of property rights evolution.  If it 
can be well-explained by another theory, then our confidence in Demsetz’s wealth 
maximization theory might be diminished.  Two competing theories of property rights 
evolution are particularly prominent in the legal academic literature:  distribution and 
ideology.  Both theories argue that a community may not adopt property regimes that 
maximize societal wealth.  But neither theory fares well when applied to the sidewalk 
used by illegal vendors.   
The theory of distribution rests on the interest group theory of politics.119 It 
claims that different property rights regimes will favor different groups, and a community 
“will adopt those regimes whose distributional features are most favorable to the groups 
that can organize most effectively to influence the political process.”120 Thomas Merrill 
has used this theory to explain why market mechanisms, which promise to generate 
added wealth for society as a whole, are so little used in environmental law.121 Well 
organized groups, such as labor and existing businesses, do not find free adoption of 
those mechanisms to be in their narrow self-interest.122 
119 Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 280 (2000) (summarizing the 
theory). 
120 Id.
121 Id. at 277. 
122 Id. at 291-293.   
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This perspective does not fit well with the allocation regime adopted by illegal 
sidewalk vendors.  The theory of distribution assumes the existence of a political process 
in which groups compete for the selection of property rules.123 The property rights 
regime on the sidewalk was not adopted by any state entity or quasi-political body.  A 
local street gang may have a role in sidewalk vending.  But the evidence suggests that its 
role is limited to enforcing the regime that was already in place rather the adopting the 
property rights regime in the first instance.  Because there was no entity to be influenced 
in the adoption of the system for allocating sidewalk vending space, the distribution 
theory does not seem to be a good fit at first glance. 
Even when examined more closely, the theory of distribution does not seem any 
more powerful in explaining what happened on the sidewalk.  The distribution theory 
claims that a group’s influence over a process to consider a change in a system of rights 
is determined by a number of factors, including (1) the cost of organizing the group; (2) 
the stakes each group member has in the proposed change; and (3) whether the interests 
of the group members are aligned or in conflict with respect to the proposed change.124 
Application of these factors to the sidewalk suggests that vendors would have little 
influence in a decision-making process to consider changing rights to vend on the 
sidewalk.  Many who vend do so only temporarily.  Constant change in group 
membership raises costs of organizing the group.  Nor is there a great deal to fight over 
on an individual basis.  Limitations imposed by the environment and city government 
limit the per capita stakes of sidewalk vending rights.  Finally, vendors do not have 
identical interests in sidewalk rights.  Temporary vendors would prefer a regime in which 
 
123 Id. at 280 (2000) (“groups are assumed to compete in an effort to persuade regulators to adopt those 
instruments that distribute the greatest wealth to themselves”). 
124 Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 280 (2000). 
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rights to vend could be quickly obtained an lost, while established vendors might instead 
favor one where vending rights could be obtained and lost only slowly.  The theory of 
distribution does not explain why vendors were able to adopt a regime for allocating 
space on the sidewalk. 
The theory of ideology appears to fit no better.  This theory argues that a 
community will adopt a property regime that reflects an aspiration, such as 
egalitarianism, that is widely held among community members.125 The theory of 
ideology was used by Andrea McDowell to help explain the content of a system of rules 
adopted by miners during the California Gold Rush.126 In some mining camps, there 
were limits on the size of claims and the number that could be held at the same time, as 
well as claim notice and work requirements.127 These limitations were not wealth 
maximizing for society as a whole, but rather advanced the miners’ own group interests 
in conformity with new ideologies of egalitarianism and anti-capitalism.128 
There are some similarities in the facts of mining during the California Gold Rush 
and those of vending on sidewalk today.  Vendors stake claims to sidewalk space.  Their 
spaces appear to be limited in size, specifically to what they can physically occupy with 
their wares.  While some vendors work for someone else, most are self employed, and all 
of them seem to have rights to use only the space they occupied and no other.  There is a 
kind of work requirement, at least for some vendors.  If a new vendor leaves the 
sidewalk, another may take their place.  There is no evidence that a vendor can hold more 
than one spot at a time.   
 
125 Andrea G. McDowell, From Commons to Claims:  Property Rights in the California Gold Rush, 14 
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 (2002) (miners in Gold Rush California developed restrictions on claim holder 
rights that did not maximize the production of wealth for society as a whole, but rather reflected new norms 
of egalitarianism and anti-capitalism). 
126 Id.
127 Id. at 33, 44-45 (2002). 
128 Id. at 58, 61 (2002). 
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But the similarities end there.  Significant differences exist between mining 
claims during the California Gold Rush and sidewalk claims today.  First, the stakes are 
dramatically different.  Even the choicest spots for sidewalk vending are of fairly limited 
value.  By contrast, mining claims for gold were potentially worth a fortune.129 Second, 
the risks are likewise dissimilar.  In part because even the best vending spots are not all 
that much more valuable than the poorest vending spots, the risks involved in sidewalk 
vending are fairly minimal.  Mining during the Gold Rush was a different story.  One 
might dig for days and come up empty handed, while another in the same amount of time 
would earn thousands of dollars.130 The high potential payoffs and great risks in gold 
mining lead some to advocate a greater expansion of private property rights in mining 
claims.  Specifically, they argued that restrictions on the number of claims that could be 
held by any on miner should be removed.131 This raised the specter of concentrated 
power and monopoly.  It was against this threat that miners reacted, as evidenced by 
arguments made by their representatives, their correspondence, and their codes that 
restricted claim rights.132 Sidewalk vending is different.  The low risks and low potential 
payoffs in sidewalk vending have deterred large scale capitalists from arguing for 
expanded property rights in the sidewalk.  There is no danger of sidewalk monopoly, and 
thus no danger against which venders have been compelled to react. 
 
129 Id. at 63. 
130 Id.
131 Id. at 50. 
132 Id.
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C. The City’s Method of Allocating Space Is Better Explained By The 
Distribution Theory Of Property 
 
The method of allocating space adopted by illegal sidewalk vendors differs 
greatly from that adopted by the city of Los Angeles for legal vending.  Demsetz’ wealth-
maximization theory has some explanatory power for the city’s approach, but it is 
limited.  The city’s approach is better explained by the distribution theory of property. 
Demsetz’s wealth-maximization theory of property has several parts.  One of the 
weaker components of his theory is that as demand for a resource increases, “new 
property rights emerge in response to the desires of interacting persons for adjustment to 
new benefit-cost possibilities.”133 This aspect of Demsetz’s thesis is confirmed by the 
city’s foray into sidewalk vending.  For many years the city of Los Angeles refused to 
recognize any kind of property right to vend from the sidewalk.  To the contrary, the city 
made sidewalk vending a kind of anti-property.  Those practicing it were guilty of a 
misdemeanor.134 But this prohibition notwithstanding, demand for vending space on the 
sidewalk increased substantially during the 1980s and 1990s, as reflected by the dramatic 
increase in sidewalk vendors during that period.135 The city responded to this increased 
 
133 Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S609, 
S649 (2002) (private property rights to live bison herds did not evolve, despite increasing market demand 
for bison).  Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies For Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (increasing demand does not necessarily lead to increased 
privatization in the first instance). 
134 Los Angeles, Cal., Mun. Code 42(b) (2004). 
135 See Leslie Berestein et al., Wheeling and Dealing; Street Vendors Risk Citations and the Ire of Other 
Merchants as They Try to Eke Out a Living, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Feb. 2, 1995, at J12 (stating that 
sidewalk vending "proliferated after a surge in Latin American immigration"); Penelope McMillan, Street 
Vendors - In Between a Rock and a Hard Place, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Dec. 23, 1988, Metro, 2, at 1 
("What we're seeing in the streets of Central Los Angeles is a dramatic increase in street vending."); James 
Rainey, L.A. Looks For Palatable Solution to Street Vending, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Dec. 9, 1993, at 
A1 ("The immigration boom and simultaneous contraction of the job market have resulted in a dramatic 
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demand by enacting an ordinance that created a mechanism by which legal vending 
districts could be established in the city and vendors be allowed to ply their trade on the 
sidewalk.136 The city approved the establishment of two legal vending districts, including 
one in MacArthur Park.137 The city contracted with a third party to manage the 
MacArthur Park district, who subcontracted the task to the Institute for Urban Research 
and Development (“IURD”).138 The IURD assumed responsibility for allocating space 
among the legal vendors who were to sell from the district.139 In doing so, the city and its 
agent, the IURD, created new property rights for qualifying vendors in the sidewalk.   
This action by the city is consistent with Demsetz’s argument to the extent he 
claims that new property rights emerge for a resource when demand for it increases.  But 
Demsetz’s argument also contains stronger components, including that the property rights 
that do emerge do so “in accordance with a criterion of social wealth maximization.”140 
As explained by Thomas Merrill, “if the social benefits of a property regime exceed the 
social costs of creating and enforcing such a regime, then society will recognize property 
rights over a resource.  Conversely, if the social benefits of a property regime do not 
exceed the social costs of creating and enforcing such a regime, the society will not 
 
neighborhood, "police began enforcing the law against street sales about six months ago [in April 1987] 
after area business owners complained that "the problem with vendors was getting totally out of hand'").  
Between 1987 and 1992, the number of illegal sidewalk vendors in Los Angeles grew from 1000 to 4000.  
Raymond L. Sanchez, Street Vendors Pay High Price for Unlicensed Trade in L.A., L.A. TIMES, Home 
Edition, Oct. 26, 1987, Metro, 2, at 1; Plan to Legalize Street Vending Comes Under Fire, L.A. TIMES,
Home Edition, Jan. 14, 1992, Metro, Part B, at 2. 
136 L.A., Cal., Mun. Code 42(m)(1), (m)(2)(B), (m)(6) (1999); Kara Glover, L.A. Gets a Sidewalk Vending 
Law, After Four Years of Consideration, LOS ANGELES BUSINESS J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 11; James Rainey, 
L.A. Looks For Palatable Solution to Street Vending, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Dec. 9, 1993, at A1;  
137 Rhonda Roumani, Hernandez Announces Launching of City's First Sidewalk Vending District, 
Metropolitan News Enterprise (Los Angeles), June 4, 1999, at 11. 
138 Interview with Joseph Colletti, Executive Director, Institute for Urban Research and Development, in 
Los Angeles, California (July 16, 2002).   
139 Id.
140 Thomas Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 278 (2000). 
60
recognize property rights over the resource.”141 In other words, whatever property rights 
regime is created will be cost justified.  The allocative benefits brought about by the new 
rights regime will outweigh its costs.  The new property rights will be efficient.   
The city of Los Angeles’ property regime for legal sidewalk vending does not fit 
nearly as well with this stronger, “efficiency” component of Demsetz’s thesis.  As to 
whether the city’s approach maximized wealth, the evidence is equivocal.  Los Angeles’ 
ordinance did not create any districts where vending would be legal, instead it created an 
intensely bureaucratic process by which such districts could be created.142 A district had 
to be approved by twenty percent of the property owners in the area.143 Individual 
property owners had the right to veto vending from the sidewalk immediately adjacent to 
their property.144 This approach may have been taken out of a concern that legal vending 
risked imposing negative spill-over effects on neighboring property owners.  Some 
thought that vendors might attract crime, contribute to undue congestion on the sidewalk, 
and generally compete unfairly with traditional storefront merchants.145 These risks 
would have to be addressed to the satisfaction of the expected victims—neighboring 
property owners—before a district could be created.   
But the facts surrounding the creation of legal vending districts are more 
consistent with a distribution theory of property.  I have argued elsewhere that many of 
the negative spill-over effects of vending are exaggerated or do not exist at all.146 The 
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real objection to vending stemmed from a desire on the part of traditional store-front 
merchants to suppress legitimate competition from sidewalk vendors.  Merchants feared 
not only increased competition from legalized vending, but also decreased relative 
prestige.  For this reason storefront merchants opposed legalizing vending, and fought to 
shape the ordinance to ensure that the only districts approved would be those that were 
certain to generate positive spill-over effects, if they endured at all.147 
The merchants got what they wanted.  The ordinance did not make vending legal 
city wide, but rather created a process by which legal vending “districts” could be 
established.148 The ordinance limited the number of districts to eight.149 Though vending 
proponents advocated for the establishment of as many districts,150 only two were 
created.  One started with six carts and went downhill from there.151 It limped along for 
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two years before becoming completely inactive.152 The second district, in the MacArthur 
Park neighborhood, was created not adjacent to any traditional storefront business, but 
rather in the park itself.153 Merchants conditioned their approval of the district on a 
promise that no vendor would sell a product sold by any of the storefront businesses in 
the area.154 The city ordinance requires vendors to sell from city-approved carts.  The 
carts are expensive, but beautiful, and maybe that is the point.155 By presenting a more 
attractive appearance to the park and not selling any competing goods, area storefront 
merchants must have believed that the legal vending district in MacArthur Park would 
attract more shoppers to the area.  This would benefit the merchants.  If the district failed 
(which it did, five years later), the merchants would not be any worse off than they were 
before the ordinance was passed. 
So when it comes to choosing where to set up on the sidewalk, legal vendors’ 
choices are severely restricted.  At this macro level, the city’s new property rights regime 
for sidewalk vending space seems better explained by a theory of distribution than by 
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wealth-maximization.  What about at the micro level?  Was the regime for allocating 
individual spaces to vendors within the MacArthur Park legal vending district any 
different?  Is it better explained by a theory of wealth maximization, or does it too fit 
better with the theory of distribution? 
The legal vending district at MacArthur Park was managed by the IURD, which 
had assumed responsibility for allocating individual spaces to legal sidewalk vendors.  
When the district was about to open, between twelve and twenty legal vendors had 
completed the training program and were waiting to start selling from the sidewalk.156 
As detailed above, the vendors were unable to agree on a system for allocating space and 
the IURD assigned them first by lottery.  As a way to assign a scarce vending space to the 
vendor that values it most, the lottery method seems inferior to the rule of first 
possession, whose efficiencies are described above.  The IURD took a different approach 
when it latter reassigned vending spaces.  It was then concerned with benefiting the 
vendors, but also sought to beautify the neighborhood.  It may not have been possible to 
do both well.  Even this new approach appears to have fallen short of maximizing the 
value of sidewalk vending, as viewed from the street.  Even on the busiest days of the 
week, near the district’s peak health, less than half the legal vendors showed up to work.  
The presence of so much unused capacity in the legal vending district may be explained 
by a host of factors, including that the park is a poor place to vend.  But one cannot help 
but wonder whether allowing the legal vendors to have settled on an allocative rule of 
first possession would have resulted in more complete use of the sidewalk there. 
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It is an open question whether the property rights regime for legal vending 
resulted in any allocative efficiencies.  Whatever allocative efficiencies have resulted, 
they appear to have been less than those enjoyed by the system adopted by the illegal 
vendors across the street.  But allocative efficiencies are just one part of the equation.  
Administrative costs likewise figure into the concept of efficiency, and in this respect the 
evidence suggests that wealth may not be maximized by the legal vending regime’s 
system of property rights.  The legal vending ordinance was debated for years.157 After it 
was enacted and a property rights system for sidewalk vending broadly outlined, the 
IURD was hired to fill in the details and manage the district.  For the first year of its work 
the IURD was paid $235,000.158 Of course the IURD did a lot more than just allocate 
space on the sidewalk.  But whatever it spent on space allocation issues is more than what 
has been spent by the illegal vendors across the street.  When asked why the legal 
vending district closed, the IURD cited the high cost of managing it and the drying up of 
grant money from the city and state of California.159 All told, the property rights regime 
for legal vending offers only equivocal support for the wealth maximization theory of 
property.  At least in regards to property rights in a macro sense, the legal vending 
regulatory system is much more consistent with a property theory of distribution. 
 
157 Louis Sahagun, Council OK's Districts for Street Vendors, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, Jan. 15, 1992, at 
A1; Kara Glover, L.A. Gets a Sidewalk Vending Law, After Four Years of Consideration, LOS ANGELES 
BUSINESS J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 11; James Rainey, Vendors Cheer as Legalization Wins Final OK, L.A. 
TIMES, Record Edition, Jan. 5, 1994, at A1. 
158 Lee Romney, Group of Street Vendors Licensed in Test of Reform, L.A. TIMES, Home Edition, May 7, 
1999, Business, Part C, at 1. 
159 Interview with Sandra “Mama” Romero Plasencia, Program Director, Institute for Urban Research and 
Development, in Los Angeles, California (March 14, 2006). 
65
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I compare one formal and one informal system for allocating land in 
a commons in a specific context:  sidewalk space for vending.  I explain why each system 
for allocating scarce vending space on the sidewalks in Los Angeles arose, explain what 
the system entails, and judge its desirability.  The “why” part of the inquiry provides an 
opportunity to test the power of various theories of collective action against real world 
facts.  Against rival theories of social norms and street gang government, Robert 
Sugden’s game theory of spontaneous order appears best to explain the ability of illegal 
vendors to arrive at a method for resolving disputes over space.  It also does a fair job of 
explaining why legal vendors in a city-run vending district across the street were unable 
quickly to settle on method for allocating space there. 
The “what” part of the inquiry is also important.  It provides an opportunity to test 
various theories of property rights evolution and determine which of the two methods of 
allocating land is more desirable.  These theories include Harold Demsetz’s theory of 
wealth maximization, and theories of distribution and ideology.  The substantial number 
of allocative and administrative efficiencies enjoyed by the first possession system 
adopted by illegal vendors offer substantial support for the theory of wealth 
maximization.  The city’s approach to sidewalk vending is more equivocal.  When it 
comes to allocating space within the legal vending district among vendors, there are signs 
that the value of the sidewalk was being maximized.  But when one considers the 
administrative costs, the high levels of unused capacity in the district, and the fact that 
MacArthur Park is effectively the only place in the city where it is legal to vend, a 
different picture emerges.  Rather than maximizing wealth for the entire community, at 
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the macro level the city’s approach to allocating rights in the sidewalk seems more 
attuned to concerns of distribution.   
This paper is optimistic.  Self-interested strangers have coordinated their vending 
activities to maximize the value of the sidewalk.  They have done this not just in the 
absence of government help, but in the face of government hostility.  These illegal 
vendors developed wealth maximizing order not in the law’s shadow, but rather in its 
absence.  I hope municipalities and other governmental entities will take note when 
considering how to respond to sidewalk vending in their communities. 
There are of course limits to this analysis, confined as it was to the sidewalk.  One 
should not conclude from this study that formal government-imposed property rights 
regimes should be avoided generally.  Not every dispute over a resource shares 
characteristics of hawk-dove games, where spontaneous order is likely to emerge.  But 
where they do, it seems that government should tread lightly.  A research agenda might 
be to look for other resources where hawk-dove conditions are present.  Where 
spontaneous cooperation may not be achieved and social norms are not a viable tool, 
there is a role for government.  But the rule systems it adopts do not have to conform to a 
theory of distribution; they might instead be wealth maximizing.  This suggests further 
study on how the decision-making processes of the state can be set up so that all interests 
are represented, and wealth maximizing rules have a better chance of emerging.  In the 
meantime, there’s always the sidewalk. 
